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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZEN HEALING ARTS, L.L.C., 
d/b/a BEACHES BODYWORKS, JEFF 
l@ STUCKI, and LEISA METCALF 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, UT AH DIVISION OF 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, AND 
JOHN DOES I-X 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20160241-CA 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UT AH, HON. BARRY G. LAWRENCE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all matters not specifically 
granted to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(I). 
(@ Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3- l 02( 4 ), the Supreme Court may transfer all but 
a few defined cases to the Comt of Appeals; and the Supreme Court did so in this 
case. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
QUESTIONS OF LAW: 
A. Is the remedy chosen by the District Court of Dismissal with Prejudice in 
regard to Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Action, within the power of the Court to 
grant? The Court may only "refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or 
decree where a judgment or decree, if rendered or entered would not terminate the 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding. 
This issue was preserved for Appeal by Plaintiffs' Defendant's Motion (under 
Rule 59-insert details here). The question here involves statutory construction and 
constitutional interpretation. It is a legal question that is reviewed for correctness, 
according no deference to the decision of the District Court. See State v. J.M.S. 
(State ex rel. J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, 280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and Bushco v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 2009 UT 73,225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009). 
B. Is the Rule at issue within the power of the Division and/or Department to ~ 
issue, and is it consistent with the statute it was designed to implement, interpret or 
administer? 
This issue was preserved for Appeal by Plaintiffs' Trial Brief and Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion for (Rule 59). The question here involves statutory 
2 
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construction and constitutional interpretation. It is a legal question that is reviewed 
for correctness, according no deference to the decision of the District Court. See 
State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, 280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and 
Bushco v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2009 UT 73, 225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009). 
C. Does the Rule itself, or the statute as modified by the Rule, deny Plaintiffs 
Due Process of Law, and is the Rule overbroad and/or unconstitutionally vague? 
The question here involves statutory construction and constitutional 
interpretation. It is a legal question that is reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the decision of the District Court. See State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. 
J.M.S.). 2011 UT 75, 280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and Bushco v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 2009 UT 73, 225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009). 
The question here involves statutory construction and constitutional 
interpretation. It is a legal question that is reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the decision of the District Court. See State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. 
J.M.S.). 2011 UT 75, 280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and Bushco v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 2009 UT 73, 225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT 
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ISSUE: 
The following items will be reproduced in an Addendum hereto: 
H.B. 243, 2011 General Session showing changes in definitions under the 
Massage Therapy Practice Act. 
H.B. 114, 2012 General Session showing changes in definitions under the 
Massage Therapy Practice Act. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-1-502 
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-102 (2012) (current) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-47b-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-47b-501 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-47b-503 
Rule R156-47b-102 of Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
City Department, Salt Lake County, dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs Declaratory 
Judgment Action. Plaintiffs sought a Declaratory Judgment that Rule Rl 56-47b-102 ~ 
of Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is in conflict with the 
Massage Therapy Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-4 7b-102. Alternatively, 
4 
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Plaintiffs sought a Declaratory Judgment that the state, as modified by the Rule, is 
overbroad and/or unconstitutionally vague. 
The Complaint also included a Second Cause of Action for review of an 
informal decision of the Department of Commerce. Based on the Ruling requested 
above, Plaintiffs asked that citations issued to them for violations of the Massage 
Practice Act be dismissed. Those citations were issued by DOPL on or about 
September 1, 2012 at an establishment operated by Plaintiff Zen Healing Arts, L.L.C. 
where Plaintiffs admit that they engaged in "light touch plus movement" of others 
for a fee. Plaintiffs contended that they did not engage in the practice of massage 
therapy as defined by statute, and that the citations were arbitrary and capricious 
attempts to interfere with a lawful business endeavor of which Defendants 
disapprove. 
The Court held a Trial de Novo of issues previously before a hearing officer 
'viJ of the Division of Professional Licensing. Plaintiffs brought a Motion for Partial 
summary Judgment as to their First Cause of Action, resulting in a Partial Summary 
v;; Judgment in their favor. That Judgment also substantially affected the Second Cause 
of Action, which involves the Administrative action by Defendants against Plaintiffs 
for the unlawful practice of massage therapy. 
5 
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The Court later, sua sponte, "clarified" its Partial Summary Judgment. The 
assigned Judge then retired. After a trial de novo on the outstanding citations, the 
Court canceled the Partial Summary Judgment in its entirety and Dismissed Plaintiffs' 
action with prejudice. In doing so, the Court upheld the contested Rule in its entirety 
and declined to construe it or to restrict it as the previous Judge had done in the 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Zen Healing Arts, d/b/a Beaches Bodyworks, is a Utah Limited 
Liability Co. Its principal place of business is in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Said 
Plaintiff operates a relaxation studio and is licensed by Salt Lake County. R.24. 
Treatments administered by Plaintiff include various spiritual healing arts that date 
back many centuries. This involves touching the skin to create energy, and to direct ~ 
energy to various parts of the body. Id. 
Treatment does not involve therapeutic massage, and every customer is " 
required to sign a consent form acknowledging that they understand that they are not 
receiving a massage. R 25. Treatments may include the art of Reiki, which may 
include touching as a relaxation and healing technique. Massage techniques of 
"systematic manipulation" are not included. Id. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is a Division 
of the Department of Commerce, and is charged, under Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-1-
106( 1 )(a) with adopting rules to administer the provisions of the Utah code within its 
jurisdiction. Utah Code § 58-47b-102 defines the practice of massage. That 
~ definition section was modified by the legislature in 2011 to broaden the definition 
of what was included in the term "massage therapy". The word "therapeutic" was 
removed from the definition. The Legislature, in 2012, largely reversed the law 
changes of 2011, restoring the word "therapeutic" to the massage therapy definition, 
and removing the term "recreational" under purposes. Those changes, and their effect 
on Division enforcement, are at issue in this action. Below is the current version of 
Section 58-4 7b-102, definitions: Note that bracketed terms have been removed, and 
underlined terms added, as the statute was changed in 2011 and 2011. Copies of the 
Bills showing the changes are in the Appendix, along with the full current version. 
(3) "Homeostasis" means maintaining, stabilizing, or returning to 
equilibrium the muscular system. 
(6) "Practice of massage therapy" means: 
(a) the examination, assessment, and evaluation of the soft tissue 
structures of the body for the purpose of devising a treatment plan to 
7 
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promote homeostasis; 
(b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue 
of the body for the [therapeutic] purpose of: 
(i) promoting the therapeutic health and well-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
(iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
(iv) relieving pain; 
( v) restoring metabolic balance; and 
(vi) achieving homeostasis; [and] 
(vii) [recreational] or other purposes; 
( c) the use of the hands or a mechanical or electrical apparatus in 
connection with this Subsection ( 6); 
( d) the use of rehabilitative procedures involving soft tissue of the body; 
( e) range of motion of movements without spinal adjustment as set forth 
in Section 58-72-102; 
(t) oil rubs, heat lamp, salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, shower, 
steam, and cabinet baths; 
(g) manual traction and stretching exercise; 
(h) correction of muscular distortion by treatment of the soft tissues of 
the body; 
8 
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(i) counseling, education, and other advisory services to reduce the 
incidence and severity of physical disability, movement dysfunction, and 
pam; 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-476-501, it is unlawful to practice, engage 
in or attempt to practice "massage therapy without holding a current license as a 
~ massage therapist or a massage apprentice under this chapter." Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-476-503, "any individual who commits an act of unlawful conduct 
under Section 58-47b-501 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." A violation of the 
Massage Therapy Practice Act may also bring an administrative sanction, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-501 and 58-1-502, which may include fines of up to 
$1,000 and a "cease and desist order". 
On or about December 15, 2011, Defendants published a Notice on their 
website of a proposed additional definition, to be included as a part of Rule R156-
47b, known as the "Massage Therapy Practice Act Rule". That Rule, in Part Rl56-
4 7b-102 contains definitions which are to assist in administering the provision of the 
Massage Therapy Act. The addition to the Rule states: 
(8) "Manipulation", as used in Subsection 5 8-4 7b-102( 6)(b ), means contact 
with movement, involving touching the clothed or unclothed body. R. 31, 159. 
The Rule greatly expands what may be considered "massage". 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff Stucki followed the instructions on the website and submitted written 
comments objecting to the adoption of the rule. He also appeared at the hearing at 
which the rule was discussed and adopted, and made an oral presentation in 
opposition to the rule. He and a number of others filed written comments on or 
before the due date, opposing the change. The Division did not respond to the written 
comments. The Rule went into effect on January 26, 2012, without additional 
discussion. R. 57-58. 
The 2012 legislative bill, HB 114, originally contained the same language as 
the Rule, adopted at around the same time. At a committee hearing on February 6, 
2012, (only 10 days after the Rule went into effect) the expanded definition of 
massage therapy at issue here was dropped from the bill. The sponsor of the bill 
indicated that the definition had caused concerns from chiropractic physicians. R. ~· 
291. 
Sally Stewart, a "Bureau Manager" over Massage Therapy for Defendant ~ 
D.O.P.L. previously filed an affidavit with this Court, dated April 23, 2012, as to the 
circumstances of the adoption of the Rule, and stated as follows: 
Clarification also provided a written reference concerning potential abuses of 
the profession and public so as not to allow unqualified, unlicensed individuals 
to take advantage either physically or financially. The Division and the Board 
10 
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felt that the promulgation of the rule was necessary for the protection of the 
public and the profession. R. 170. 
The decision of the Board was at least partially in reaction to unfavorable court 
rulings in which attempts to use the Massage Therapy Practice Act as a weapon 
against escort agencies, had failed. See Orem City v. Wood, Case No. 101200072, 
R. 294, in which the Court ruled that an escort who offered a "massage" as part of an 
escort appointment, along with "a sexy dance [or] the modeling of provocative 
lingerie". After listing the goals of a professional massage, from the Act, the Court 
stated: 
Arguably, the evidence may eventually show that Defendant's massage in this 
case resulted in some or all of these benefits. However, it is undisputed that 
Defendant never held herself out as a "massage therapist" or as an expert in 
massage. Moreover, it is not alleged that Defendant ever represented to her 
client that her massage techniques would result in any of these benefits or that 
the massage was being given of any of these therapeutic purposes. Therefore, 
there is no - and apparently will never be any - evidence that Defendant 
engaged in the massage "for the purpose of' achieving these results. R. 296. 
(Emphasis in original). 
Agents of Defendant have testified in vanous administrative and court 
proceedings that the new definition in the Rule was "the position of the Division", 
even before the Rule was adopted, and without notice of that "position" to those who 
might be affected by it. 
11 
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Ms Stewart testified in an administrative proceeding involving Plaintiffs 
Roman and Metcalf: 
Manipulation is just that, it is contact and movement. If you are merely laying 
your hands upon your body, that is not manipulation of tissue. If you take that 
hand and move it around. you are manipulating the soft tissues, whether you 
are doing so in a light fashion, a medium fashion or in a deep tissue type of 
practice." (Tr. 57) (Emphasis added). R. 314. 
Ms. Stewart was later deposed in reference to this matter. According to Ms. 
Stewart, the rule was for purposes of clarification only. It was asked for by licensed 
professionals. She was involved in preparing the rule; but she does not determine 
who is required to be licensed. R.324. She was involved in the 2011 legislative 
changes because: 
There were some areas where a person may have claimed not to have been 
doing therapeutic massage and that had not been previously included in the 
language within the scope of practice. That word was removed because the 
individuals chose to regulate, not just therapeutic massage, but also 
recreational or relaxation massage. They are the same techniques but serve 
different purposes and that was discussed with various individuals. R.322. 
Rubbing a person with lotion would generally be considered to be a cosmetic 
process. However, in the practice of massage therapy, you are dealing with 
potential harm to an individual through sanitation, safety in terms of too much 
pressure, too little pressure, effleurage as a very light touch technique can close 
of lymphatic system, can cause health effects. You have contagion, you may 
have unsanitary conditions possible. You have an number of potential threats 
to the public safety and welfare. Id. (Emphasis added). 
12 
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At a Preliminary Hearing in State v. Cash, Third District Court, West Jordan 
Department, Case No. 111402066, held on January 31, 2012, Allison Robinson, an 
investigator for D.O.P.L, also testified: 
We have a definition that speaks to massage. There are a lot of different 
components to it. Mr. McCullough had touched on some of those components 
although it is the Divisions' position that not all of these components must be 
engaged in in order to be practicing massage therapy. However, the 
manipulation of soft tissue is mentioned and we view manipulation of soft 
tissue as any contact with movement. R.340. 
Ms. Robinson, now Ms. Pettley, was also deposed on December 12, 2013. She 
has no college education; but she took a 5 week POST class for "special function 
police officer". R.341. She reads the statutes and rules on her own, to decide what 
the law is, and how it should be enforced. R.343. She knows generally the terms 
~ used in massage, through her own reading. She is "aware that there is a lymphatic 
system in the body" and that massage can enhance the circulation of it. R.344. The 
statute refers to "achieving homeostasis". She thinks she would know if she saw this 
being achieved; but it is "subjective", so she has "discretion" as to whether to cite. Id. 
Ms. Pettley was not an investigator when the statutory changes were made in 
2011. She was an investigator in 2012, when those changes were largely reversed. 
She did not believe that those changes were significant in her investigations, and did 
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not make any changes because of them. The addition of the term "recreational 
purposes", and then its removal did not affect her work, as the law retained the term 
"for other purposes". Id. Her citations are "typically for contact with movement." She 
does not typically cite people for any of the other myriad "modalities" of massage, 
such as counseling, educating or advising. Id. 
According to Ms. Pettley, if a licensed escort rubs a client on the arm, to show 
affection, 
that would depend on whether he hired her to rub him." I would say if the 
client hired the escort to provide rubbing for him, that would be a violation of 
the Massage Therapy Practice Act. 
... what I'm saying is if he hired her to rub him in whatever capacity and he 
paid her, that would be a violation of the Massage Therapy Practice Act. 
R.345. 
The term "manipulation", as in the contested rule, is her guideline. It does not 
matter that it is not applied in a therapeutic manner, or that it is not purported to have 
a health benefit. She cites people who touch other people for a fee, if there is 
movement with the touch. Id. 
She states that "my plate is full with people that are touching each other." 
"The violation of the law is offensive to me, yes." She relies on her own reading of 
the statute and rule. R. 331. If an unmarried man receives a massage from his 
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girlfriend, and he takes her to dinner to show his appreciation, Ms. Pettley believes 
that his would be a violation. R. 332. The following question and answer were part 
of the deposition: 
COUNSEL: But you really do have your plate full of people touching each 
other and it's - I mean it's so far you can't get around it, isn't it? 
WITNESS: It's a very - there is a very large population of people that are out 
there that are violating the Massage Therapy Practice Act, yes. R.346. 
She was an investigator before the Rule at issue was passed in January, 2012; 
and she did not change her enforcement because of the Rule. Prior to that, "it was 
always the standard that the definition of massage therapy included contact with 
movement. It was just clarified in writing." Id. 
Defendants named as an expert witness Ms. Sharon Muir, the Chair of the 
~ Board of Massage Therapy, as created by Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-201. The duties 
of that Board include assisting the Division Director in governing the regulated 
profession, including suggesting Rules and setting requirements for licensure. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-202, 203. A member of the Board is to "assist the division 
in reviewing complaints concerning the unlawful or unprofessional conduct of a 
licensee. Utah Code Ann. § 58-47b-201(3)(a). (Emphasis added). 
Ms. Muir prepared an Expert Report. She stated that: 
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As Chair of the Board of Massage Therapy, I am aware of concerns raised by 
numerous parties that unlicensed massages including massages of a sexual 
nature were being performed under the guise of Reiki and that there was a need 
for clarification of DOPL' s Rule governing the practice of massage therapy to 
keep illegal sex businesses out of the massage profession. 
It is my opinion that the Board and DOPL acted within the scope of their 
authority to regulate the massage therapy profession by promulgating the 
amendment to Rule 156-4 7b- l 02. The amendment to the rule was necessary 
to establish clarification in the guide lines as to what constitutes the practice 
of massage therapy. 
It is my opinion that this type of conduct and behavior is detrimental and 
seriously undermines the integrity of the massage therapy profession and the 
Reiki petitioners. R.3 7 4. 
In answers to Interrogatories, Defendants state the following, regarding the 
reasons for the enactment of the Rule: 
Concerns were expressed by the Utah League of Cities and Towns, the State 
Board of Health, and Murray City about Reiki businesses and how they were 
being used as fronts for prostitution at a Massage Therapy Board Meeting held -
on September 20, 2011 which prompted a discussion for the rule amendment. 
Additionally, members of the public in attendance at the September 20, 2011 
meeting expressed concerns about the misrepresentation of the practice of 
Reiki by individuals as fronts for sexually oriented businesses and prostitution. Cw 
(Ans. #6). 
In answers to Interrogatories, Defendants state the following, regarding the 
abuses of the profession" referred to in Ms. Stewart's previously filed affidavit: 
The actual or potential abuses referred to [in] Ms. Stewart's Affidavit of April 
23, 2012 include physical harm, financial harm, being used as a vehicle for 
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prostitution or sexual abuse and as a vehicle for human trafficking. (Ans.# 12). 
The potential harm to the client of the recipient of a massage by someone who 
isn't licensed as a massage therapist are that they are deprived of the right to 
a legitimate massage and may be exposed to harm by an unlicensed person who 
does not do the massage in the right way. The client may also be exposed to 
illegal prostitution under the guise of massage therapy. In addition, unlicensed 
massage therapists may be subject to human trafficking. (Ans. # 15). 
In Answers to Interrogatories regarding the function of"touch plus movement", 
Defendants stated: 
The massage practitioner is a professional who is engaged in the business of 
giving appropriate, nurturing, and ethical touch. The massage or body work 
profession is unique in that human touch is the primary vehicle whereby 
services are preformed. Whether it is relaxation, wellness massage, sports 
massage, Therapeutic Touch, or the specifically applied soft tissue 
manipulation of clinical massage, it is the beneficial human response to 
skillfully applied touch that is the basis for the success of the massage 
profession. Touch is an essential element for healthy growth and development. 
From a very early age, positive touch affects human physical and emotional 
health through our lives. 
Mui ti ple studies show that the positive touch of massage reduces stress, lowers 
blood levels of cortisol and norepinepherine, while increasing levels of 
serotonin and dopamine. Low levels of serotonin and dopamine are evident in 
people who suffer from depression, whereas significantly higher levels are 
associated with elevated moods. 
In the therapeutic setting, the practitioner is the giver, and the client is the 
recipient of touch. The massage professional' s business is to provide caring, 
compassionate touch to the client. Massage therapists practice it every day and 
are comfortable administering touch as therapy. (Ans. #26). 
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In Answers to Interrogatories regarding whether there was a limit on the 
licensing of the human touch, Defendants stated: 
It is Division and Board's position that "contact with movement involving 
touching the clothed or unclothed body" or another person relates to the scope 
of practice of massage therapy as set forth in the Massage Therapy Act 58-47b-
106 and does not involve incidental contact referenced such as shaking 
someone's hand or patting someone on the back." (Ans. #27). 
But "touch plus movement' is not always massage, even it it is with lotion. 
The practice of Esthetics is related to the practice of massage and may overlap. 
According to Ms. Stewart in her deposition: 
A master esthetician also has the expanded expertise and additional training to 
do more complicated processes and to do lymphatic massage if so trained. 
A master esthetician is doing skin treatment. 
Placing lotion on the skin is a skin treatment. And, therefore would fall under 
a cosmetic treatment of the skin, which is part of the definition of the scope of 
practice for a master esthetician. R. 321-322. (Emphasis added). 
Ms. Stewart also testified at the previous evidentiary hearing involving the 
individual Plaintiffs herein. It is her opinion that light or medium touching constitutes 
massage therapy, and is a form of mechanical manipulation of soft tissue. It is also 
her opinion that doing a body rub with lotion is massage therapy. Use of lotion can 
be used for either esthetics or massage therapy. R.309. Using light or medium touch 
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to manipulate muscles and achieve relaxation is part of "the modality of effleurage" 
R.310. Soft tissue is defined as the muscles and related connective tissue by the 
statute. Id. Skin is connective tissue as well. R.311. If a person is using lotion and 
is manipulating the soft tissue, it's still massage therapy. 
Whether they are using lotion, water, oil or any other substance, it is the 
act of a light touch massage therapy, the medium touch or whichever that is a 
violation of the practice of massage therapy, not that you are using the lotion 
per se, but that you are practicing massage therapy." R.3 13. 
Manipulation is just that, it is contact and movement. If you are merely laying 
your hands upon your body, that is not manipulation of tissue. If you take that 
hand and move it around, you are manipulating the soft tissues, whether you 
are doing so in a light fashion, a medium fashion or in a deep tissue type of 
practice." R.314. 
Reiki may be hands on, but it does not involve manipulation of the tissues nor 
movement. R.315. It would not be possible for a person to apply lotion to someone's 
body without manipulating the soft tissue. R.31 7. 
Plaintiffs retained Whitney W. Lowe as an expert witness. Mr. Lowe has 
taught massage at several schools, both private and public, and has written three 
books on the subject. He has also contributed to other books and written several 
peer-reviewed articles. His Expert Report was received by the Court at trial and made 
part of his testimony. 
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The primary purpose of licensure for massage therapists is to protect public 
safety. In order to require licensing, there must be a demonstration of potential 
public harm that relates to the particular occupation being licensed, in this 
case, massage, and which can be mitigated by the licensing process. As a 
result, it is crucial to have a solid definition and parameters for what 
constitutes massage therapy. Each state that licenses massage makes choices 
about how to define the practice. To be defensible, these definitions should 
reflect the generally accepted definitions and understanding of what constitutes 
massage therapy in the profession. Expert Report, Exhibit 5 at trial(sealed). 
Mr. Lowe states that there is potential physical and psychological harm from 
untrained massage: 
In most states, the maJonty of complaints against pract1t10ners involve 
psychological components and inappropriate behavior by practitioners as 
opposed to harm induced by improper massage techniques. 
Because many municipalities have a large job in cracking down on illicit and 
inappropriate mass services, it is understandable that professional licencing 
organizations would seek greater clarifications and opportunities to more 
specifically delineate the role and practice of massage therapists. Yet, simply 
casting a wider net for the definition of massage in an effort to include more 
individuals within the regulatory umbrella is not necessarily acting within the 
interest of public safety. Report p. 2. 
Mr. Lowe states the following regarding the regulatory efforts of the Utah 
Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing to further "clarify the definition of massage therapy": 
The Utah DOL definition as a whole is consistent with other accepted 
definitions of massage in the profession. In particular it agrees with the 
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definition provided by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine, at the National Institute of Health, which states, "in general 
therapists press, rub, and otherwise manipulate the muscles and other soft 
tissues of the body. People use massage for a variety of health related 
purposes, including to relieve pain, rehabilitate sports injuries, reduce stress, 
increase relaxation, address anxiety and depression, and aid general well 
being." 
It appears that the effort to expand the definition of massage with this practice 
act rule is to cast a wider net of regulation over a larger number of individuals 
in the hopes that this effort could reduce the number of people who are 
operating illicit massage establishments, but not calling their specific practice 
"massage therapy." While I understand the intent of the board's actions, the 
conceptual and semantic repercussions of this action are problematic. 
There is no doubt that massage therapy includes "contact with movement, 
involving the touching of the clothed or unclothed body." Yet, what follows 
is an erroneous and implied assumption that any activity which involves said 
'contact with movement' should be defined as massage. There are numerous 
healing arts practices such as Alexander Technique, Feldenkrais Method, 
Trager Method, Relexology, and Polarity Therapy,just to name a few, which 
involve contact with movement. However, these practices are not by definition 
massage therapy, and are routinely exempted from massage therapy 
methodologies as massage therapy. A defining difference being that these 
modalities are not massage oriented, which is direct intervention in soft-tissue 
(muscle, fascia, ligament, tendon)function. 
It is highly problematic and inconsistent for the board to simply state that any 
activity involving contact with movement is by nature massage therapy and 
consequently subject to regulation under the massage therapy practice act. In 
addition to the aforementioned healing arts practices, numerous other practices 
such as yoga, martial arts, or even more traditional health care practices such 
as chiropractic or acupuncture could also fall under this definition. Report. P. 
3-4. 
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Based on the foregoing. Mr. Lowe gave his expert opinion: 
It is my expert opinion that this current proposed rule change in the definition 
of massage therapy extends beyond the scope of accepted definitions and 
understanding. Effective enforcement of licensing laws for public safety are 
predicated on rational and reasonable definitions of scope of practice for that 
licensing law. While I see the intent beyond the rule change, the wording of 
the change has served to cause greater confusion around the implementation 
of the Massage Practice Therapy Act. 
The chief challenge remains to enforce the existing stature and rules around 
massage therapy based on the prior existing broader definition of massage, 
rather than regulating by application of only one of the defining characteristics 
included in the law. 
On the Division's website is an application for a Massage Therapy license, 
including a curriculum list. The applicant is expected to list the courses he or she has 
completed, including the following requirements: 
Anatomy, Physiology and Kinesiology - 125 hours minimum 
Massage Theory Including the Five Basic Swedish Massage Strokes - 285 
hours minimum 
Professional Standards, Ethics and Business Practices - 35 hours minimum. 
Sanitation and Universal Precautions Including CPR and First Aid - 15 hours 
mm1mum. 
Clinic - 100 hours minimum 
Pathology - 40 hours minimum 
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Other Related Massage Subjects as Approved by the Division - no specific 
requirement 
Total hours - 600 hours minimum. 
The application also includes "a criminal background check and fingerprint search". 
Plaintiffs submitted a course description of the Professional Massage Therapy 
Program at the Utah College of Massage Therapy. The cost of the program is 
$11,828.17, plus books and supplies at $920.99. The course, if taken full time, will 
take 32 weeks, or 52 weeks, in the evening. R.353-355. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The regulated profession of massage therapy is defined by statute, and is a 
healing art. DOPL and the Massage Board have reduced it to a caricature with a Rule 
which prohibits any person for "rubbing" another for a fee. The enforcement of the 
rule is arbitrary and capricious and the Rule and enforcement deny Plaintiffs Due 
Process. On one hand, DOPL officials say that putting lotion on the skin is a 
"comment" purpose; and on the other hand they cite properly licensed Estheticians 
merely because of who they may associate with. The chief investigator says she is 
nearly overwhelmed with cases of "people touching each other', and the reign of 
terror continues. The Rule is not a legitimate attempt to aid enforcement of the law, 
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but is an attempt to become "morality police" without statutory authority, guidelines 
or training. 
The Rule at issue is arbitrary, capricious, confusing and unconstitutionally 
vague, thus rending the underlying statute vague as well. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MASSAGE RULE AT ISSUE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTS. ~ 
According to Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-3-602: 
(l)(a) Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule 
by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the 
person resides or in the district court of Salt Lake County. 
(2)(b )When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not exhaust that 
person's administrative remedies if: 
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule became 
effective and the person had submitted verbal or written comments on 
the rule during the public comment period. (Emphasis added). 
Defendants acknowledge Plaintiff Stucki filed written comments in opposition to the 
Rule, on or about January 17, 2012; and that Plaintiff Stucki and others made an oral 
presentation to a board meeting on January 1 7, 2012. Defendants further 
acknowledge that these actions "constitutes exhaustion of administrative remedies as 
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required by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. R. 160. 
When an aggrieved party challenges a Rule in a Declaratory Judgment 
proceeding, the responding agency must file a responsive pleading, and must "file the 
administrative record of the rule, if any, with its responsive pleading." See Utah Code 
~ Ann. § 63G-3-602. While the Division filed a responsive pleading, they did not 
supply the full "record", which should include a transcript of the hearing, and the 
meetings at which the rule change was discussed and adopted. A motion to compel 
the filing of the complete record (R. 224) was denied by Ruling dated 4/23/13, (R. 
624 ). Defendants countered that they had supplied to Plaintiffs the audio recordings 
of meetings where the Rule had been discussed and voted upon. Defendants further 
stated that the State only pays for transcripts for indigent defendants in criminal 
matters. (R. 384-385). Both Defendants and the Court missed the point, that the 
statute specifically puts the burden on the agency to provide the entire record. 
According to Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-3-602(4): 
The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by: 
(a) declaring the rule invalid if the court finds that: 
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole administrative record. 
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The Court did hear testimony from Sharon Muir, the Chair of the State 
Massage Board. This Board consists of four licensed massage therapists, and one 
member of the general public. The Board's duties include "Recommending to the 
diurector appropriate rules." Utah Code Ann.§ 58-1-202. The Court made Findings 
of Fact based on Ms. Muir's testimony: 
3. The Court found Ms. Muir to be credible, yet she too was heavily biased as 
an advocate of the State's position. Nonetheless, Ms. Muir demonstrated to the 
Court that she was an expert on massage therapy ( and Reiki) based on her 
backgrounds and qualifications. Accordingly, the Court gave her opinions 
regarding the field of massage therapy great weight. In Ms. Muir's opinion, 
the conduct undertaken by the Plaintiffs - i.e., the alleged light touching on the 
arms, legs and back - did constitute massage, and in fact was a recognized 
modality known as "effleurage". 
4. Ms. Muir also testified that it is important to regulate the filed of massage 
therapy and to require licenses to practice it in order to protect the integrity of 
the massage therapy profession. 
69. According to Ms. Muir who was on the governing Board and had first 
hand knowledge of the Rule's passage, the Board promulgated Rule 156 
(Rule"), Utah Admin. Code R 156-4 7b, to define the term "manipulate" in the 
broadest sense possible - i.e., to reflect that contact plus any movement 
whatsoever, constitutes manipulation. The reason for such a broad 
construction was twofold, First, to make certain that Reike - which involves 
contact but no manipulation of the skin, i.e. channeling energy for alleged 
healing-durative purposes by contact with the skin - is not subject to the 
Massage Therapy Act. Second, to broadly define massage therapy to reflect 
the generally accepted notions of massage therapy: for example, deeming "light 
touch" as a modality of massage. (Emphasis in original) 
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The Court accepted Ms. Muir's testimony as to the needs and reasons for the rule at 
face value; including her characterizations of the testimony of those who made 
presentations at Board meetings. This is the whole point of the statute which requires 
the Court to review the "whole administrative record", rather than to just take the 
word of those who have an interest in upholding the rule. 
Further, Ms. Muir testified as a fact witness, as head of the Board. She also 
testified as an expert witness. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Exclude Ms.Muir as an 
expert. R. 564. Plaintiffs pointed out her lack of expertise on some of the matters 
on which she offered testimony, such as the need to use regulations to protect the 
integrity of the profession (Finding 4 ); and they also pointed out that she was 
essentially testifying as an expert as to the reasonableness of her own action in 
adopting the rule, which is an obvious conflict of interest. She testified that she felt 
the Board and Division needed to do something to help law enforcement officials, 
who claimed that they needed additional regulation to fight prostitution. Ms. Muir 
has no training or expertise in the social problem of prostitution, and she has no law 
enforcement authority; but clearly she felt moved upon to "protect the public" from 
such activity, despite the fact she had no authority to do so. All of this would have 
been clear if the whole administrative record" had been filed with the Court, as 
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required by law. Instead, Ms. Muir was allowed to say that she felt the Rule was 
necessary to protect the public, based on input from law enforcement officers. She 
most certainly should not have been allowed to do this.1 
It seems very clear from the "plain language" of the statute that it is the duty 
of the Court to review the "whole administrative record", and make a determination 
as to whether the rule is "supported by substantial evidence". The Defendants claim 
that providing audio tapes to Plaintiffs of hearings constitutes filing "the 
administrative record of the rule, if any"; but when viewed together with the 
requirement that the court determine, "whether the rule is supported by "substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole administrative record", it is obvious that 
it is not the duty of Plaintiffs to prepare the record for the court to review. The Court 
below suggested that, if Plaintiffs wanted the Court to review the whole record, they ~ 
could prepare a transcript as they would do in an appeal; but that certainly has no 
support in the statute. The burden is on the State to show that the Rule was based on ~ 
substantial evidence, a burden the State made no attempt to bear. The Court has 
specific authority and direction to delve into the facts upon which the Rule is based. 
1 There is no clear record of the Court ever ruling on 
Plaintiffs' Motion, but obviously the Court refused to 
exclude the testimony. 
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Is the Court expected to listen to audio recordings? That requirement makes no 
sense; but how else will the Court make the determination that the law requires it to 
make? Why then, did the State not "file [the audio recordings] with its responsive 
pleading", rather than produce the recording to Plaintiffs as part of its discovery? 
(@ Obviously, the Court did not listen to the recordings, or otherwise review the "whole 
administrative record". The interpretation of the statute endorsed by Defendants and 
the Court is not within reason. The failure of the Court to review whether the Rule 
was supported by substantial evidence, and to use the whole record, is fatal to the trial 
court's entire decision upholding the validity of the rule. Thus, the trial Court denied 
Plaintiffs Due Process of law by not requiring the State to justify its Rule, using its 
record, as required by statute. For this reason alone, the Judgment of the District 
Court should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded for proceedings in 
conformity with statute. 
POINTIB 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELOW IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT 
AND IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS OR THE LAW. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401, et seq., grants 
a district court "the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights, status, 
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and other legal relationships within its respective jurisdiction." This includes the ~ 
power to interpret a statute, see Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 (Utah 
2008), or to determine the constitutionality of a statute, see Grand County v. Emery 
County, 52 P.3d 1148, 2002 UT 57 (Utah 2002). The Declaratory Judgment Act 
specifically allows parties who may be in danger of enforcement action under a 
statute or rule to challenge either the validity or the interpretation of the statute 
without fear of that enforcement action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-602 ( 4 ), which specifically relates to Judicial review 
of rules, states specifically that the Court may grant relief by: 
(a) declaring the rule invalid if the court finds that: 
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not 
have the legal authority to make the rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the statute governs what the law 
is, not an administrative rule; and the Rule cannot add to or subtract from the statute. 
See Ferro v. Utah Dept. Of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507,512 (n.7)(Utah App. 1992): 
Given the established rule that agency regulations may not "abridge, enlarge, 
extend or modify the statute creating the right or imposing the duty, IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottoson, 538 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1975), it is the stature, not 
the rule, that governs. If an agency regulation is not in harmony with the 
statute, it is invalid. (Emphasis added). 
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See also Rocky Mountain Energy v. Tax Com'n, 852 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah 1993): 
Rules are subordinate to statutes and cannot confer greater rights or disabilities."; 
and Dorsey v. Department of Workforce Services, 2012 UT App 364 (Utah App. 
2012). The Rule at issue here is not in harmony with the statute, and it seeks to 
~ greatly increase the reach of the Division over those not regulated by the statute. 
Thus, it is invalid. 
The State must also show that the Rule does not exceed its authority, and does 
not modify the statute. The State claims that local law enforcement officials 
expressed concerns about non-therapeutic establishments or practitioners who might 
be engaged in prostitution or "human trafficking". Those activities are unlawful in 
themselves. As Plaintiffs' expert has stated, it is not a valid use of the Massage 
Therapy Practice Act to tum the Division into a police agency which investigates and 
prosecutes activity which is not within the statutory jurisdiction or authority of the 
Division. Abraham Lincoln is reputed to have said: "Calling a lamb's tale a leg does 
not make it one. "2 Calling a wide range of non-therapeutic touching "massage 
therapy", does not make it massage therapy. It demeans the practice of massage 
2 Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by Distinguished men of 
his Time, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York 
1909 p. 242. 
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therapy and the Division to stoop to such ridiculous manipulation of a valid 
regulatory law. The Rule is arbitrary and capricious in that it seeks to punish 
Plaintiffs and others for conduct which is not within the grant of authority to the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
The trial Court agreed with Plaintiffs as it granted Partial Summary Judgment 
in their favor on December 2, 2013, stating in part: 
The issue before the Court is whether the Division is authorized to apply this 
definition to individuals or organizations outside the scope of their charge. 
The Division clearly does not have the authority to claim that any individual 
who has contact with movement with a third party is performing massage. See 
Mt. Olympus Waters, Inc. 877 P.2d at 1273. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment concedes that the Division has the 
right to determine the parameters of operation of a massage therapist. The 
Division may, within the scope of the Act, define the range of activities that a 
therapist is allowed to do or is prohibited from doing. However, the Division 
may not define the scope of activities including manipulation, of individuals 
that are not licensed massage therapists or holding themselves out as massage 
therapists. R. 781. (Emphasis added). 
The Partial Summary Judgment appeared to be a complete exoneration of the position 
of Plaintiffs. The Division was clearly doing exactly what the Court said they must 
not do: They were defining the unlawful practice of massage therapy simply by 
claiming "that any individual who has contact with movement with a third party is 
performing massage". Based on the ruling, Plaintiffs prepared for trial on the 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remaining issues, whether the individual Plaintiffs were doing something more than 
"touch plus movement", and were, in fact either "licensed massage therapists or 
holding themselves out as massage therapists." It seemed pretty obvious that they 
were not, and were excluded from the Division's authority by the Partial Summary 
'-@ Judgment. 
Trial was set for September 17, 2014. Defendants had the burden of proof as 
to whether specific Plaintiffs were unlawfully practicing massage therapy, and went 
forward. Defendant started right out by stating that DOPL investigators determined 
that: 
there were light touch - medium touch that was going on. 
They also said, some of them that they were using oils and lotions on the 
clients, R. 1031. 
there was also a statement from one of the client[ s] that says he got light to 
medium touch and muscle touch. R. 1032. 
Ms. Pettley explains to them that what they're doing constitutes massage. She 
goes through the code with them and she says, Look, when you're doing any 
kind of touching with movement on the skin, when you're rubbing oils and 
lotions, that's considered massage. R. 1033. 3 
3 Plaintiffs ordered a transcript and used excerpts in a 
motion; but the record does not show that the original 
transcript was filed with the court. 
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Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this evidence as precluded by the partial 
Summary Judgment. The Court took a recess, and returned to the bench to read in 
a "clarified" order by stating: 
However the Division may not define the scope of activities including 
manipulation, ofindividuals that are not licensed massage therapists or holding 
themselves out, by word or act, as massage therapists. 
The State took the position that the "clarification" voided the Partial Summary 
Judgment which clearly ruled that the State could not consider "touch plus 
movement" as massage therapy without more. The clarification, however, did not 
alter or even refer to, the ruling that the Division does not have "the authority to claim 
that any individual who has contact with movement with a third party is performing 
massage." 
The trial was thereafter continued, as the clarification materially affected the ~ 
issues to be tried, and the presentations of the parties. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to 
Amend, pointing out that the original Ruling was legally correct, and that a 
"clarification" was not warranted. In fact, the addition of the three words to the 
Partial Summary Judgment was anything but a "clarification." Plaintiff pointed this 
out, and stated: "the problem with this clarification is that it is self contradictory and 
nearly impossible to comprehend." R. 1030. 
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Shortly after the Motion was filed, the Judge retired, leaving the Motion to be 
heard by an interim judge, who denied the Motion without comment. R. 1071. 
The trial was reset for October 22 and 23, 2015, with a third Judge who had not 
been involved in the case over a period of almost three years. The Court now 
v; appeared to agree with the State that "touch plus movement" was sufficient to 
constitute the practice of massage therapy; but he did not signal the total shift in the 
Court's position, prior to trial. 
Defendants presented testimony in support of their contention that "touch plus 
movement" was the practice of massage, despite the prior court ruling to the contrary. 
The State called three witnesses, including Sharon Muir, as referred to above. The 
State also called a police officer, Lt. Cupello; but "The Court found Lieutenant 
Cupello's testimony to be of little value." R. 1274. The third witness was Allyson 
Pettley, who had been the Division's chief investigator when the case was initiated, 
but who had been promoted to Bureau Chief at the time of trial. Her testimony was 
set out in some detail in the Statement of Facts above. Ms. Pettley and Ms. Muir 
especially decried the use oflotion in any activity involving "rubbing", as previously 
mentioned. Ms. Pettley contended that the use oflotion in addition to "rubbing" was 
most clearly the practice of massage therapy. This totally contradicted the previous 
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testimony of Ms. Stewart, the former Bureau Chief, that the act of rubbing lotion on 
another person is more like esthetics: 
A master esthetician is doing skin treatment. 
Placing lotion on the skin is a skin treatment. And, therefore would fall under 
a cosmetic treatment of the skin, which is part of the definition of the scope of 
practice for a master esthetician. R. 321-322. 
So, "touch plus movement", especially with lotion, is massage, unless it isn't. And 
the state made no attempt to differentiate between the two disciplines. And, of 
course, the Division cannot differentiate between them either. A master esthetician, 
Alyssa Kelso, apparently for no other reason than that she was employed by 
Plaintiffs, was prosecuted in Davis County District Court for massage without a 
license, as a Class A Misdemeanor, through the efforts of Defendants was dismissed 
at Preliminary Hearing in Davis County, Case No. 121701518, on July 8, 2013. ~ 
The Court, in its Dismissal Order, found the evidence was "insufficient to support 
a reasonable belief that Defendant practiced massage without a license." (Order dated 
July 8, 2013). That was followed by an administrative citation by DOPL in which 
both Ms. Pettley and Ms. Stewart participated. The citation was dismissed by their 
own hearing officer, because they failed to explain the difference between massage 
therapy and esthetks. It is clear, therefore, that "touch plus movement" without 
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context, is not unlawful massage practice. Despite this. Ms. Pettley continues to 
claim that anyone who is hired "to provide rubbing for him, that would be a violation 
of the Massage Therapy Practice Act." It seems pretty obvious that this is not true; 
but the Court validated that position in its final Judgment. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on November 13, 2015. The Court made the following Findings 
of Fact, in part: 
3. The Court found Ms. Muir to be credible, yet she too was heavily biased as 
an advocate of the State's position. Nonetheless, Ms. Muir demonstrated to the 
Court that she was an expert on massage therapy ( and Reiki) based on her 
backgrounds and qualifications. Accordingly, the Court gave her opinions 
regarding the field of massage therapy great weight. In Ms. Muir's opinion, the 
conduct undertaken by the Plaintiffs - i.e., the alleged light touching on the 
arms, legs and back - did constitute massage, and in fact was a recognized 
modality known as "effleurage". 
4. Ms. Muir also testified that it is important to regulate the filed of massage 
therapy and to requite licenses to practice it in order to protect the integrity of 
the massage therapy profession. 
10. Plaintiffs also called as an expert, Whitney Lowe. Mr. Lowe, through his 
background and experience, was also an expert in massage therapy and 
therefore, the Court treated him as such. 
11. Mr. Lowe was called primarily to talk about the alleged "unfairness" of the 
administrative rule, see Utah Admin. Code R 156-4 7b, on the grounds that 
defining manipulation as any "touch plus movement" was too broad a 
definition. Notwithstanding Mr. Lowe's testimony, the issue of the validity of 
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said rule is a legal question and therefore, Mr. Lowe's testimony was only 
minimally helpful on that issue (because, as with Ms. Muir, the Court 
disregarded any purely legal conclusions or opinions.) 
12. Although Mr. Lowe did not offer opinions concerning whether the 
Plaintiffs' light touch and the use of oils in this matter constituted massage, per 
se, he did agree that a generally accepted definition of massage includes 
activities in which therapists "press, rub, and otherwise manipulate the muscles 
and other soft tissues of the body. People use massage for a variety ofhealth-
related purposes, including to relieve pain, rehabilitate sports injuries, reduce 
stress, increase relaxation, address anxiety and depression, and aid general 
well-being." (Lowe Expert Report, Pis.' Ex. 5, at 3.) Mr. Lowe also testified 
that skin was a soft tissue and that placing oil on the body, or gliding across the 
skin could constitute a massage. 
69. According to Ms. Muir who was on the governing Board and had first 
hand knowledge of the Rule's passage, the Board promulgated Rule 156 
(Rule"), Utah Admin. Code Rl 56-4 7b, to define the term "manipulate" in the 
broadest sense possible - i.e., to reflect that contact plus any movement 
whatsoever, constitutes manipulation. The reason for such a broad 
construction was twofold, First,. To make certain that Reike - which involves 
contact but no manipulation of the skin, i.e. channeling energy for alleged 
healing-durative purposes by contact with the skin - is not subject to the 
Massage Therapy Act. Second, to broadly define massage therapy to reflect 
the generally accepted notions of massage therapy: for example, deeming "light 
touch" as a modality of massage. (Emphasis in original). 
70. Plaintiffs argue that such a broad definition of the term "manipulation" 
would effectively swallow the entire act. Plaintiffs follow that in doing so, 
DOPL has, by rule, expanded its regulatory authority to cover SOB' s. While 
the Court agrees that DOPL may not, by rule, expand its regulatory scope 
beyond the governing statue, the Court concludes that the rule did not have that 
affect (sic). 
71. For example, DOPL could not pass a rule that would have the affect (sic) 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of broadening the Act to encompass certain acts ofintimate sexual conduct that 
are not "massage therapy." That, however, is not what the Rule does. 
72. In fact, the Honorable L.A. Dever previously ruled that such action by 
DOPL would be inappropriate. In his December 2, 2013 Order, as amended 
by his Order of September 17, 2014, Judge Dever held, "The Division may not 
define the scope of activities including manipulation, ofindividuals that are not 
licensed massage therapists or holding themselves out, by word or act, as 
massage therapists." The Court interprets that to mean that a rule may not 
empower DOPL to regulate people or conduct that the legislature has not 
permitted. (Emphasis added) 
73. Here, however, the Rule is simply clarifying the statue; it is not expanding 
its reach to persons who would not ordinarily be covered by the Act. The rule 
makes it clear that any movement with contact - including light touch massage, 
which is a recognized modality of massage called "effluerage" - constitutes 
manipulation. See Utah Admin. Code R156-47b(10). The Rule did not cause 
DOPL to widen their regulatory web outside of the realm of massage therapuy. 
82. In order to constitute massage therapy requiring a license, the following 
must also be shown: a) there must be payment for the services; b) the 
manipulation must be systematic: c) the manipulation must be to soft tissue: 
and d) the manipulation must be for one of the enumerated purposes stated in 
the statute. See e.g. Sec. 58-47b-102. 
83. By promulgating a rule that broadly defined "manipulation." DOPL was 
not acting inconsistent with prior practice and did not cause people who were 
not already subject to the act, to suddenly become subject to the Act's reach. 
The Rule was not an impermissible use of DOPL's authority and had a 
reasonable and rational basis - to aid DOPL in regulating massage therapy and 
to help enforce its licensure provisioned. 
The Court, specifically in Finding No. 82, appeared to agree that some restrictions 
were in order: 
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That paragraph contains two important restrictions: that touch plus movement must 
be "systematic" in order to be massage therapy; and it must be for purposes 
enumerated in the statute. Those purposes have changed back and forth a bit with 
changes in the statute in 2011 and in 2012. The Division has changed NOTHING 
about its enforcement in accord with any statutory changes. The Court appears to be 
requiring them to do so. The 2011 amendment states that massage therapy may be 
for a "recreational" purpose, and the massage does not even have to "therapeutic". 
The 2012 change added back the requirement that massage therapy is therapeutic, and 
removed the "recreational" purpose. It left, however, the 2011 language "other 
purpose" at the end; and the Division has claimed that it was not really changed at all, 
because "recreational" is clearly an "other" purpose. Plaintiffs believe that the 
removal at the same time that the word "therapeutic" was restored suggests a return ~ 
to a more healing-directed model. The Rule, of course, was promulgated before the 
2012 changes were enacted; and the Division steadfastly claims that the changes in ~ 
the law in 2012 make no difference as to what is and is not massage therapy. That 
position, once again, was validated by the Court, despite the fact that it has no 
"rational basis". 
But then, the Court denied ALL relief to Plaintiffs, nullifying all of the 
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language in Judge Dever' s previous Partial Summary Judgment, and in its own 
Findings, reducing them to dicta. 
~ The Court entered the following Conclusions of Law: 
3. The rule promulgated by DOPL defining "manipulation" as any "touch plus 
contact" is a valid exercise of DOPL' s rulemaking authority and is upheld. 
4. All of Plaintiffs claims are to be dismissed with prejudice. All parties are 
to pay their costs and fees incurred in this matter. 
And, after denying Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend or clarify the ruling. the Court 
entered Judgment: 
This matter is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Defendants. This shall stand as the final Order herein, 
fully and finally resolving this case, and any and all claims herein. 
There is no explanation for this inconsistent ruling. Plaintiffs sued under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to obtain Court guidance on the application of the statute 
and the validity of the Rule. That Rule cannot be read in a vacuum; it must be read 
(w in conjunction with the statements of the Division, and the track record of Division 
enforcement. It is certainly clear that the Division does indeed claim that any 
@ individual who has contact with movement with a third party is performing massage; 
and it enforces that view of the Rule, which is obviously invalid. The Court has told 
them they should not do this; and then has said it does not intend to give its opinion 
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the force of law, thus allowing them to continue their unlawful enforcement. The 
Order should be entered in accord with the Partial Summary Judgment as amended, 
and in accord with the final Findings of Fact that add additional guidelines for 
enforcement. Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment statute, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
an order declaring their rights and responsibilities. The Court granted this, and then 
pulled it away without explanation. This is manifest error, and it should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE MASSAGE RULE AT ISSUE IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND IS 
OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE IT SEEKS TO "CLARIFY". 
The burden is to be on the State to prove that the Rule is not "arbitrary and 
capricious", and is supported by substantial evidence. The Rule is based on an overly 
broad reading of the Massage Therapy Practice Act, one which renders the statute 
itself as unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to Plaintiff, as it sweeps within its 
ambit much constitutionally protected conduct or speech. See Provo City v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989) and Bushco v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2009 UT 73, 
225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009). See also the recent decision of this Court in State v. 
Hawker, 2016 UT App 123. 4 While a massage is not directly speech, all parties agree 
4 While the Court did not reach the constitutional issues, 
it rejected an expansive definition of "sexual activity" as 
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that the right of one person to touch another is most fundamental. R. 249-250. Many 
entertainers touch audience members as part of the entertainment. This is especially 
true for exotic dancers, for whom some touch is intrinsic to the performance. It is 
also rendered hopelessly vague in its attempts to prohibit all touching. The practice 
~ of massage therapy as defined by the Utah code includes a substantial list of 
activities. "Massage therapy " must be "systematic", and is part of an overall 
treatment akin to physical therapy. The use of this statute and this Rule to prevent 
ALL touching of one person by another in which there is any form of remuneration, 
without a professional license, is arbitrary, capricious, and violates the general rule 
that legislation and regulations must have a "rational basis". 
Plaintiffs here admit that they may put their hands on another person's skin, 
and move them. That, in and of itself is obviously not the practice of massage therapy 
as defined by statute. It is at least as likely that it is within the purview of a master 
esthetician. See again Utah Code Ann.§ 58-l la-102(34)(a)(ii): 
(34) (a) "Practice of master-level esthetics" means: 
(ii) lymphatic massage by manual or other means as defined by 
rule. 
outside the language of the statute. 
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Rule 15 6-11a-102, states, in part: 
(19) "Lymphatic massage" as used in Subsection 58-1la-102(34(a)(ii) and 58-
11 )( e ), means a method using a light rhythmic pressure applied by manual or 
other means to the skin using specific lymphatic maneuvers to promote 
drainage of the lymphatic fluid through the tissue. 
(20) "Manipulating", as used in Subsection 58-11a-102(34)(a), means applying 
a light pressure by hands to the skin. 
So, manipulation is not quite the same under the two rules, each of which purport to 
regulate "massage". As the District Court said in State v. Kelso, a lay person is not 
likely to be qualifeied to tell the difference. And, Ms. Pettley certainly qualifies as 
a lay person, as she is not trained in either discipline and is essentially self-taught. 
What appears to be the dividing line between the two disciplines is the word 
"therapy", not the word "massage". And the Rule at issue here has allowed the 
Division to engage in wholesale enforcement activity without wrrying about whether ~ 
the touching has anything to do with "therapy." That is what renders the Rule 
arbitrary, capricicious, and unconstitutionally vague. It is what encouraged the 
Division to prosecute a license Master Esthetician in the District Court, and failing 
that, to pursue administrative remedies, which also failed. Lymphatic massage, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-11a-102(34 )(i ), can be performed on pretty much 
any part of the body, including "head, face, neck, torso, abdomen, back, arms, legs, 
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feet, eyebrows, or eyelashes." If that misses any part of the body, it is certainly not 
obvious. Note that the word "movement" is not included as a necessary part of 
"lymphatic massage", though obviously it is not precluded. Does it follow, that 
touch, involving light pressure, by hands on the skin, is the unlawful practice of 
esthetics? That sounds preposterous; but it is no more so than the Rule at issue in this 
case. 
The legislature clearly did not contemplate the sheer volume and variety of 
actions that are now required to be licensed, if done for a fee. R. 339-346. Given Ms. 
Pettley's personally aggressive stance concerning those who touch others, it is 
anyone's guess where the line may be. She agrees that enforcement of the Rule may 
be "subjective", and that she has some "discretion" as to how and when it is enforced. 
Id.. What kind of touching might bring the weight of the State down on the heads 
of the offender? Would this include something as innocuous as a waitress touching 
a customer she is waiting on in a restaurant? Some service staff believe that tipping 
increases with such signs of friendliness. What about a trainer in a gym, who does 
nothing more than guide someone as to how to exercise or use a piece of equipment? 
How many people must live in fear of the stray "touch with movement", if done in 
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any kind of commercial setting?5 
The target of this action is the arbitrary, capricious and overbroad interpretation 
of the Act by the Division, and its in-house investigators. That policy is most 
specifically contained in the Rule at issue; but Ms. Pettley insists that the Division has 
pursued its current policies based on an "understanding", even before the Rule was 
adopted. 
The Division has taken upon itself the authority to construe the Massage 
Therapy Practice Act in an extremely broad manner; and clearly their determinations 
have swallowed up the act as written. Such a policy gives an officer, either one of 
their own, or an officer in a political subdivision, an unlawful amount of discretion 
to decide when a crime has been committed. Such discretion was prohibited by the 
Supreme Court, in Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 ( 1987): ~ 
Laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for 
words or conduct that annoy or offend them ... [are] not narrowly tailored to 
prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words. ~ 




Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 prohibits masturbation of 
person by another for a fee; but that is only a 
for lubrication. 
have made rubbing a 
misdemeanor? 
misdemeanor. Lotion might well be used 
Could the legislature rationally 
person 1 s arm a Class A 
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guidelines, so the Defendant will know when he or she has violated it. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972): 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if 
its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence 
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws 
must provide explicit standards fo those who apply them. A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague 
statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it 
"operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if 
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. (Emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit Court, citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983), 
held, in U.S. v. Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 2010): 
First, due process requires citizens be given fair notice of what conduct is 
criminal. A criminal statute cannot be so vague that "ordinary people" are 
uncertain of its meaning. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983). 
However, even when a statute is specific about what acts are criminal, our due 
process analysis is not complete. When, as here, predicate acts which result in 
criminal violations are commonly and ordinarily not criminal, we must ask the 
fair notice question yet again. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, 98 P. 3d 420 (Utah 
2004 ), a case with First Amendment implications, also cited Ko lender: 
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Both the United States and Utah Constitutions protect c1t1zens from 
deprivation of liberty or property absent due process of law. U.S. Const. 
Amends V & XIV, § 1; Utah Const. art. I, § 7. The Utah Controlled Substances 
Act imposes substantial criminal penalties on those found guilty of violating 
its provisions. Our constitutional guarantees of due process require that penal 
statutes define criminal offenses "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people understand what conduct is prohibited." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352,357 (1983); 
Ms. Pettley is determined to arrest and prosecute several people who have 
committed what most observers would agree is an innocent act. The policy and the 
Rule allow police officers to decide for themselves, based on a "suspicion" when 
"contact plus movement" is a crime. It seems pretty clear that a determination is being 
made based on be a suspicion of prostitution or some other "inappropriate" activity. 
The Division is charged with regulating and policing its own practitioners; but the 
law has not given the Division general police powers. They have taken these powers 
upon themselves without proper legislative authority, apparently in an effort to fight 
"prostitution and human trafficking". 
Ms. Pettley, has very limited training as a "special function" law enforcement 
officer. She has no particular education for her position; and she apparently does not 
even have much supervision. It is her intent to go out and find people who touch 
other people for a fee, and to cite them for a Class A Misdemeanor. Certainly, the 
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suppression of these vices is not part of the regulation of massage. Yet the Division 
claims that the passage of this one sentence rule gives them that authority. 
The problem here is that the Rule is apparently designed, and clearly being 
enforced, in a manner aimed at adult entertainers. It is only these people, looked 
Vu down upon by the authorities, who are the objects of criminal enforcement. The 
dividing line between "incidental touching" and that which will result in an arrest, 
is entirely in the minds of the law enforcement officers. 
The burden surely must be on the government to produce SOME evidence that 
such draconian use of the law is both necessary and proper. The enforcement 
activities of the Division and its allies are not contemplated by the Statute; and the 
Division has no authority to add to the law, especially in light of the specific 
determination of the legislature not to enact this change. 
With this Rule, the Division has strayed out of the regulation of a profession, 
and turned its main focus onto people who touch other people, without being part of 
the profession. The actions at issue here are actions capable of being performed by 
~ any person upon any person. It does not take any training whatsoever for one person 
to say to another: "let me just rub your back and shoulders, and make you relax." If 
such activity is the unlicenced practice of a regulated profession, there is no validity 
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whatsoever in the issuance of a license or in regulation of the profession. In fact, 
massage therapy is much more than that. Defendants, prior to filing their Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. In their ~ 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion, they entitled a whole section of their 
Memorandum: 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT MASSAGE THERAPY IS A 
SPECIFICALLY DEFINED PROFESSION HAS NO BASIS IN 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. 
Plaintiff makes a tortured argument that massage therapy is a specifically-
defined profession but provides no legislative history or decisional law to 
support that argument. R. 3 8. 
They denied it again in Paragraph 7 of their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint: 
"Defendants also deny that Massage Therapy is a specifically defined profession." 
R. 159. That statement is so obviously false and nonsensical as to need no further ~ 
rebuttal. If it is not a defined profession, what is it? Why is it regulated and licensed 
by the Division of Professional Licensing; and why does it take months of specific ~ 
schooling and a proficiency test to obtain a license? 
Defendant also pointed out below that the legislature changed the definitions 
in its 2011 amendments to eliminate the requirement that massage therapy be 
therapeutic. So, the State seems to agree that, in its zeal to stop people from touching 
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each other, an effort was made to destroy massage therapy as a profession. Such an 
admission is mind boggling. Much of the damage the legislature did to the profession 
in 2011 was reversed in 2012, and massage therapy is once again therapeutic. If the 
2011 amendments removed the need for massage to be therapeutic, and the 2012 
amendments restored that requirement, how can those changes be totally ignored by 
the Division? How can the Division claim that its enforcement has undergone no 
changes as the statute expanded and contracted? The changes clearly are 
contradictory, and appear to reflect confusion in what is to be accomplished. 
Apparently, the Rule at issue has been deemed by the Division to insulate it from 
legislative changes; and the Division has no authority to do so in this manner. 
It cannot be emphasized too much that the Division seeks to criminally 
prosecute, those who engage in the touching of another person's skin for commercial 
purposes. The testimony of the Bureau Manager and her investigator is clear. It is 
their intent to actually license touching by one person of another, and to require 600 
hours of training, at a cost of thousands of dollars. The scope of the power grab is 
simply breathtaking. It obviously is not reasonable for the Division to take upon 
itself this kind of authority. 
See again the decision in Orem City v. Wood. That decision, rendered before 
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the 2011 amendments, completely rejects the overbroad authority claimed by the 
Division. That decision is very much at odds with the decision of the trial court in 
this matter. Perhaps those amendments were intended, in part, to overturn that 
decision, or to preclude others like it; but those changes were repealed only one year 
later. 
At the very time when a new bill defining the practice of massage therapy was 
introduced in the legislature, the Division was attempting to amend the law by using 
its rule-making powers. Ms. Stewart denies involvement in the 2012 legislative 
activity, R. 327; but it is an unlikely coincidence that the exact same language 
defining "manipulation" was simultaneously introduced in the legislature and by the 
Division. Ms. Stewart and her cohorts were not dissuaded by the removal of the 
identical language from the 2012 Bill. So, the legislature declined to pass the new 
definition, apparently because of concerns by other professionals. Yet the Division 
claims that the definition can be "implied" within the existing law. That claim is ~ 
preposterous. The Division does not appear to making a good faith effort to enforce 
the law as it exists, but instead to engage in a moral crusade against perceived evils 
which does not fall within their statutory authority. 
In Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F.Supp.2d 1212 (D. Utah 2012), Plaintiffs sought 
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declaratory relief in Federal Court against the Division of Professional Licensing. 
They claimed that the Division's licensing and regulation of the practice of African 
hair braiding as cosmetology was "arbitrary, excessive, and anachronistic". The 
Plaintiff there claimed the denial of rights under: 
the Due Process, Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the 
Inherent and Inalienable Rights, Due Process, and Uniform Operation Clauses 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The Federal District Court in Utah stated the standard of proof: 
Review of both Plaintiffs Due Process and Equal protection claims must be 
based on the rational relation test. The Court must decide whether there is any 
rational connection between Utah's regulatory scheme and public health and 
safety when applied to Jestina. In order to prove a substantive due process 
claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the government's action was 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare." While the fit between this interest 
and the means employed need not be perfect, it must be reasonable. "There 
must be some congruity between the means employed and the stated end or the 
test would be a nullity." The Supreme Court has long recognized that "a state 
can require high standards of qualification" to pursue an occupation, "but any 
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or 
capacity" to engage in the chosen profession." Courts have also made it clear 
that may not "treat persons performing different skills as if their professions 
were one and the same, i.e., ... attempt to squeeze two professions into a 
single, identical mold," because this results in standards of qualification that 
have no rational connection to a person's actual profession. Id. At 1214. 
The State countered: 
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that the styling of hair, including hair braiding, requires knowledge of 
sanitation, sterilization, diseases of the skin and scalp as well as an 
understanding of business and business laws including state and local health 
requirements. Sanitation and sterilization requirements are necessary to protect 
the public and the licensed professionals from harm caused by the transmission 
of lice and diseases like HIV AIDS. Id. 
The Court looked at the training necessary for a cosmetology license in Utah. It 
found that "1400 to 1600 of the 2000 hours of the mandatory curriculum are ~ 
irrelevant to African hairbraiding." It also found that "the State admits that it cannot 
guarantee that the subjects it claims are relevant to African hair braiding will be given 
more than minimal time in any cosmetology/barber school". The State did not know 
if any schools in Utah taught anything about African hair braiding; and admitted that 
the standard textbooks "total 1 700 pages, but only 3 8 pages mention braids of any 
kind, much less African braids." The State also admitted that its exam to obtain a 
cosmetology license does not include any mention of African hair braiding. And 
finally, the State admitted that "it never considered African hairbraiding when 
creating its 1 icensing scheme." Id. At 1216. The Court found that the State's 
requirement of a cosmetology license was irrational, in imposing irrelevant and 
burdensome requirements on African hairbraiders. Id. The District Court in Southern 
California reached the same conclusion in the earlier case of Cornwell v. Hamilton, 
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80 F .S upp.2d 110 I (I 999). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs claim that the application of a professional massage 
therapy licensing scheme to a simple process of touching the skin and moving the 
hands, is irrational and unconstitutional. The chief investigator for DOPL stated in 
her deposition that something as simple as a romantic partner who caresses her 
significant other, followed by that partner buying her dinner to show appreciation, 
runs afoul of the law. Can anyone claim with a straight face, that this kind of contact, 
if remuneration follows in any form, requires 32 weeks of course work and training, 
at a cost of over $12,000? The arbitrary and capricious nature of the regulations 
enacted by the Division could not be more obvious. In fact, if the Division were not 
so serious, the whole thing would be nothing but laughable. This Court is urged to 
tell the Division that their regulations are beyond silly, and that they are indeed 
"arbitrary, excessive, and anachronistic", and also that they are irrelevant and unduly 
burdensome. The regulations deny both equal protection and substantive due process. 
They do not comport with the requirements of the statute, and are thus beyond the 
duty and authority of the Division to enact. 
Obviously, it is also instructive that the Utah Legislature considered a change 
in the law to add this definition to the Massage Therapy Act, and declined to proceed 
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with that change. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rule at issue here not only unlawfu lly extends the Massage Therapy 
Practice Act, it involves Div is ion personnel in general law enforcement, in an 
apparent effort to fight "prostitu tion and human trafficking" and involve the Division 
in an area where it has no jurisdiction, and no business. The Rule and its 
enforcement are entirely arbitrary and capricious, and allow the Divis ion's "special 
function" investigators unlawful di scretion on who and how to cite those accused of 
"contact with movement." The Court's power extends to reviewing that record to 
determine if the rule is supported by substantia l facts . The record does not show 
substantial facts which support the division abandoning its mission to regulate a 
profession, in favor of pt[.secution of those with whom the Divis ion does not agree . 
. 1..-r 
DATED this_lf day of September, 2016. 
' L.L.C. 
W. An w McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce,tify that on the /l f day of September, 20 I 6, I hand delivered 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, to STANFORD 
PURSER, Deputy Solicitor General, 160 East 300 South Sixth F loor, Salt Lake City, 
UT. 
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FILE_D DISTRICT COURT 
Thrrd Judicial District 
~eoi 2013 
SALT LAKE CCUNTY 
B:y.-----~--
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZEN HEALING ARTS, LLC, d/b/a 
BEACHES BODYWORKS, 




UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
UTAH DIVISIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING, and JOHN DOES 1-X 
Defendants. 
ORDER and PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 120900860 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before this Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs were represented by W. Andrew McCullough. The 
Defendants were represented by Laurie L. Noda. The Plaintiffs are requesting that the 
Court find that the Division's Rule R156-47b-102(8) is constitutionally overbroad, vague 
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The new rule states that 
"[m]anipulation as used in Subsection 58-47b-102(6)(b) means contact with movement 
over the clothed or unclothed body. 11 
In interpreting statues and rules, the Utah Court of Appeals has given direction to 
the trial court. As pointed out in State v Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ,I 19, 121 P .3d 42, 
When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince 
the true intent and purpose of the legislature. To 
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discover that intent, we look first to the plain language 
of the statute. When examining the statutory language 
we assume the legislature used each term advisedly 
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning. 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Coupled with the above, is a second directive. This directive gives guidance to 
the Court in reviewing administrative rules promulgated by State Agencies. As noted in 
Mt. Olympus Waters, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 1n, 877 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
[A valid rule] must be in harmony with its governing statute[.] 
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304, 
1306 (Utah 1993) ("It is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent 
with its governing statutes. Thus, a rule that is out of harmony 
with a governing statute is invalid."). "The authority of 
administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations 'is 
limited to those regulations which are consonant with the 
statutory framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor 
beyond its scope.' " Dusty's, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 
P .2d 868, 871 n. 5 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (quoting Crowther 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 
App.1988)). It is up to the legislature ... to restrict the 
statutory language used. [internal citation omitted]. Indeed, 11 an 
administrative interpretation out of harmony and contrary to the 
express provisions of a statute ... would in effect amend that 
statute." Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 
42, 45,361 P.2d 1112, 1113 (1961). 
(emphasis added). 
As clearly pointed out by the court, it is up to the Legislature, not a State Division 
2 
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to restrict or expand the statutory language used. A Division's interpretation that is not 
in harmony with the statute or contrary to the express provisions of the statute would in 
effect be an attempt to amend the statute. Clearly, an action that is prohibited. 
With these directives in mind, a review of the Massage Therapy Practice Act is 
appropriate. It clearly provides in the definition section (58-47b-102) that a massage 
therapist is an individual licensed under Chapter 478 of the Act. Also, under section 
102 is a detailed list what comprises the practice of massage therapy. 
The Division amended Rule 156-47b in January of 2012, adding a definition to 
the term "manipulation. 11 The Defendant's argue that the purpose of the amendment 
was to clarify the term manipulation in the act. They also stated it was to address 
issues of prostitution and illicit sexual activity. It is unclear on what basis the Division 
has authority to regulate activities outside of the confines of the Massage Therapy 
Practice Act. Clearly, the Division can appropriately sanction a massage therapist for 
violation of the provisions of Act. See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-501 et. seq. The 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Division has the authority to regulate licensed 
~ therapists and has the authority to sanction those claiming to be massage therapists 
that do not hold a license. 
The Plaintiffs allege that the Division is attempting to expand the definition of 
massage by stating "manipulation means contact with movement." The Division is 
within its authority to expand or clarify terms by the use of rules as long as those 
3 
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actions do no run afoul of the Act. As pointed out in Merriam-Webster: 11Manipulate is 
to move (muscles and bones) with your hands as a form of treatment." available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manipulate (accessed Oct. 7, 2013). The 
Division's definition in the rule does not appear to run afoul of the Act. 
The issue before the Court is whether the Division is authorized to apply this 
definition to individuals or organizations outside the scope of their charge. The Division 
clearly does not have the authority to claim that any individual that has contact with 
movement with a third party is performing massage. See Mt. Olympus Waters, Inc., 
877 P.2d at 1273. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment concedes that the Division has the right 
to determine the parameters of operation of a massage therapist. The Division may, 
within the scope of the Act, define the range of activities that a therapist is allowed to do 
or is prohibited from doing. However, the Division may not define the scope of 
activities, including manipulation, of individuals that are not licensed massage therapists 
or holding themselves out as massage therapists. Id. 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 201 O UT 33, 1J44, 232 
P.3d 1059 (citation and quotations omitted); see also Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 
4 
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UT App 203, ,I6, 94 P .3d 301 ("A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct 
measures up to the required standard." (citation omitted)). 
This case involves an interpretation of the statute and the application of the 
Division's rule to the statute. There are no material facts in dispute. A Motion for 
Summary Judgment is properly before the Court. 
Conclusion 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment that the Rule R 156-4 7b-102 (8) 
does not apply to individuals outside of the Massage Therapy Practice Act is well taken 
and the Motion is Granted. This constitutes the FINAL ORDER of the Court, no further 
Order is necessary. 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 2013 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER and 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed this ~ day of December, 2013, 
to the following: 
Andrew McCollough 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
6885 South State Street, Ste 200 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Laurie B. Noda 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Clerk of Court 
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!FILED DISTRICT CIURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 17 2014 
Sy 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ~ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZEN HEALING ARTS, LLC, d/b/a 
BEACHES BODYWORKS, 




UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
UTAH DIVISIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING, and JOHN DOES 1-X 
Defendants. 
CLARIFICATION OF 
ORDER and PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 120900860 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
Deputy Clerk 
The above entitled matter was before this Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The Court issued an Order and Partial Summary Judgment on 
December 2, 2013. It has been brought to the Court's attention that a clarification of a 
portion of a paragraph on page four is needed. 
The paragraph on page four states as follows: 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment concedes that the 
Division has the right to determine the parameters of operation of a 
massage therapist. The Division may, within the scope of the Act, define 
the range of activities that a therapist is allowed to do or is prohibited from 
doing. However, the Division may not define the scope of activities, 
including manipulation, of individuals that are not licensed massage 
therapists or holding themselves out as massage therapists. Id. 
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The paragraph should read as follows: 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment concedes that the 
Division has the right to determine the parameters of operation of a 
massage therapist. The Division may, within the scope of the Act, define 
the range of activities that a therapist is allowed to do or is prohibited from 
doing. However, the Division may not define the scope of activities, 
including manipulation, of individuals that are not licensed massage 
therapists or holding themselves out, by word or act, as massage 
therapists. Id. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 2014 
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Certificate of Delivery 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Clarification 
was hand delivered on September 17, 2014, in open Court to the following: 
Andrew McCollough 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
6885 South State Street, Ste 200 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Laurie 8. Noda 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
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Clerk of Court 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
FILED DIITIICT CIUB"i 
Third Judicial District 
ZEN HEALING ARTS, L.L.C. d/b/a 
BEACHES BODYWORKS, JEFF 
STUCKI, and LEISA METCALF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 




NOV 1 3 2015 
SALT LAKE COUN"I 'f ~ 
BY------~-::-:~~~-Depu erk 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 120900860 
Judge Barry G. Lawrence 
This matter arises out of citations issued by the State of Utah, through its Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL") against Plaintiffs, Leisa Metcalf and Jeff 
Stucki, for practicing massage therapy without a license. The citations were upheld before all 
relevant administrative tribunals, and Plaintiffs now seek de novo review before this Court. 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to i) dismiss the citations with prejudice and, ii) declare that a Rule (i.e., 
Message Therapy Practice Act Rule Rl56-47b) promulgated by DOPL in 2012 is unlawful and 
unconstitutional. 1 
1 The Amended Complaint also contains other arguments attacking the statute as unconstitutional as well. 
Plaintiffs did not pursue those arguments at trial; and, there were no arguments presented to the Court that the 
relevant licensing statutes went beyond the power of the legislature to regulate the area of massage therapy or, were 
-1-
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I. STATUTORY SCHEME REGARDING LICENSING OF MASSAGE THERAPISTS: 
A. The Governing Statute 
This case is governed by the Massage Therapy Practice Act (the "Act"). See Utah Code 
Ann.§ 58-47b-101, et. seq. Utah Code Annotated Section 58-47b-301, requires a person to have 
a license in order to "charge or receive a fee or any consideration for providing a service that is 
within the practice of massage therapy." Id. at Sec. 58-47b-30l (2)(c). Section 58-47b-l02 
defines the "practice of massage therapy" by setting out various actions or conduct, any one of 
which constitutes massage therapy. Notably, because the actions at issue here occurred in 
August, 2011, the 2011 version of that statute applies, even though some changes were made to 
the statute in 2012. The following reflects the 2012 version of Part 102, with the changes made 
from the 2011 version noted: 
(6) "Practice of massage therapy" means: ... 
(b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue of 
the body for the purpose of: 
(i) promoting the [therapeutic] health and well-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
(iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
(iv) relieving pain; 
(v) restoring metabolic balance; 
(vi) achieving homeostasis; or fandt 
(vii) {recreational 01] other purposes; ... 
(f) oil rubs, heat lamps, salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, shower, 
steam, and cabinet baths; 
otherwise constitutionally infirm. See generally Utah Code Ann. §58-47b-201 (describing in part, the duties of the 
Board of Massage Therapy). 
-2-
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Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-102.2 Also of note, Section 58-47b-304 enumerates various 
exemptions from the licensure requirement. That list includes various health care 
providers, athletic trainers, therapists, and persons performing gratuitous massages. Id. 
The Act also created a Board of Massage Therapy (the "Board"), see Utah Code 
Ann.§ 58-47b-201, which has rulemaking authority. Utah Code Ann.§ 58-l-203(l)(c). 
B. Rule R156-47b 
In 2012 - effective after the relevant dates herein - the Board promulgated a rule 
that defined the term "manipulation, as used in Subsection 58-47b-102(6)(b), [to] mean[] 
contact with movement, involving touching the clothed or unclothed body." Utah 
Admin. Code R156-47b(l0). That Rule was not in effect when the citations were issued 
to the Plaintiffs herein. Accordingly, it shall not be considered in determining whether 
the citations were properly given in this case. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs ask this Court to 
issue a declaratory judgment that the Rule exceeded the State's authority. That legal 
argument will be addressed below. 
II. FINDINGS OFF ACT 
A. Brief Summary of Evidence: 
1. The State called three witnesses: Allyson Pettley, the Bureau Manager and former 
investigator for DOPL in their Massage Therapy division; Sharon Muir, the 
2 In other words, in 2012, the word "therapeutic" was added, the "and" was changed to an ''or" and the 
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Chairman of the Board, and an expert3 on massage therapy; and Lieutenant 
Michael Cupello, who investigated Plaintiffs' facility in August 2011. 
The Court found Ms. Pettley to be credible, although it was clear to the Court that 
she was heavily biased in favor of the State and was defensive of her actions. She 
was not a massage therapist, but has been involved in the enforcement of the 
massage therapy statute for years. Accordingly, while she was not qualified to act 
as an "expert" on the finer points of massage therapy, her testimony concerning 
her understanding of massage and the Act was probative and helpful. 
The Court found Ms. Muir to be credible, yet she too was heavily biased as an 
advocate for the State's position. Nonetheless, Ms. Muir demonstrated to the 
Court that she was an expert on massage therapy (and Reiki) based on her 
backgrounds and qualifications. Accordingly, the Court gave her opinions 
regarding the field of massage therapy great weight. In Ms. Muir's opinion, the 
conduct undertaken by the Plaintiffs - i.e., the alleged light touching on the arms, 
legs and back- did constitute massage, and in fact was a recognized massage 
modality known as "effleurage." 
Ms. Muir also testified that it is important to regulate the field of massage therapy, 
and to require licenses to practice it, in order to protect the integrity of the 
massage therapy profession. State's Exh. 4 at 2. 
3 See Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ,i 24, 29 P.3d 638 ("The [q]ualification ofa person as an expert 
witness ... is in the discretion of the trial court." (citation and quotations omitted)). 
-4-
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5. The Court notes, however, that while Ms. Muir's testimony concerning the history 
of Rule 156-4 7b was helpful, the Court disregards any legal opinions she gave 





The Court found Lieutenant Cupello's testimony to be of little value. He 
investigated Plaintiffs' establishment, i.e., Beaches Bodyworks ("Beaches"), to 
determine whether Beaches was in violation of sexually oriented business (SOB) 
laws. In the course of that investigation, Beaches' employees consistently stated 
that they did not engage in "deep muscle massages." Lieutenant Cupello did not 
speak with either of the named Plaintiffs, i.e., Mr. Stucki and Ms. Metcalf. He 
did, however, observe that there were oils in each of the rooms of Beaches. 
Ultimately, Lieutenant Cupello did not issue any citations or file any charges. 
The Defendants relied principally on Mr. Stucki and Ms. Metcalf, who testified 
about their business - which they described as a relaxation spa. The Court found 
them to be very credible. 
In fact, both Mr. Stucki and Ms. Metcalf each candidly acknowledged facts that 
were against their legal interest. Ms. Metcalf acknowledged performing "light 
touch massage" on her clients' arms, legs and back, but not deep muscle 
massages. She also acknowledged using oils on her clients which were, likewise, 
applied lightly. She testified credibly that she in good faith believed that she was 
not engaging in "massage therapy," as defined by the Act. 
Similarly, Mr. Stucki claimed to have had a good faith belief that his 
establishment's actions were consistent within the Act. Mr. Stucki testified about 
-5-
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the efforts he made to try to comply with his understanding of the Act, and his 
belief that the Act's definition of massage therapy did not include "light 
touching." Further, he candidly acknowledged that he did not realize that the use 
of oils was prohibited under the Act, stating that that had "slipped by him." After 
he was informed that the use of oils was a prohibited act under the Act, he ceased 
using them.4 
10. Plaintiffs also called an expert, Whitney Lowe. Mr. Lowe, through his 
background and experience, was also an expert in massage therapy and therefore, 
the Court treated him as such. 
11. 
12. 
Mr. Lowe was called primarily to talk about the alleged "unfairness" of the 
administrative rule, see Utah Admin. Code R156-47b, on the grounds that 
defining manipulation as any "touch plus movement" was too broad a definition. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Lowe's testimony, the issue of the validity of said rule is a 
legal question and therefore, Mr. Lowe's testimony was only minimally helpful 
on that issue (because, as with Ms. Muir, the Court disregarded any purely legal 
conclusions or opinions.) 
Although Mr. Lowe did not offer opinions concerning whether the Plaintiffs' light 
touch and the use of oils in this matter constituted massage, per se, he did agree 
4 Although both Mr. Stucki and Ms. Metcalf seemed to have had a good faith belief that they were not 
violating the Act , it appears to the Court that they did and, their good faith belief is not a defense under the statute. 
See State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ~ 30, 236 P.3d 161 ("It has long been recognized that ignorance or mistake of 
law provides no defense or excuse for a crime .... [, and] a good faith or mistaken belief that one's conduct is legal 
does not relieve a person of criminal liability for engaging in proscribed conduct." (citation and quotations omitted)). 
-6-
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that a generally accepted definition of massage includes activities in which 
therapists ''press, rub, and otherwise manipulate the muscles and other soft tissues 
of the body. People use massage for a variety of health-related purposes, 
including to relieve pain, rehabilitate sports injuries, reduce stress, increase 
relaxation, address anxiety and depression, and aid general well-being." (Lowe 
Expert Report, Pis.' Ex. 5, at 3 .) Mr. Lowe also testified that skin was a soft 
tissue and that placing oil on the body, or gliding across the skin could constitute a 
massage. He never opined that the precise conduct of the Plaintiffs in this matter 
was not "massage" as that term is generally recognized, and thus never 
contradicted Ms. Muir's testimony on that point. 
13. The Court also received various exhibits of note. First, a screen shot of the 
Plaintiffs' website, which disclaimed that they were conducting massages. 
(State's Ex. 1). However, despite the disclaimer, the site contained a photograph 
of a couple who appeared to be engaged in a classic massage position, which 
brought into question the sincerity of the disclaimer. Id. 
14. Plaintiffs also offered their Consent Form ("Form") (Pls.' Ex. 7), which all _clients 
were required to sign. In the Form, Plaintiffs again disclaimed that they were 
performing massages and asked their clients to agree to the following: "I 
understand that the treatment is NOT a therapeutic massage or medical treatment 
as defined by Utah Massage Therapy act Utah code 58-47b[sic]." Id. The Court 
found that disclaimer to be self serving; and, the use of the modifier "therapeutic" 
did not capture all of the statutory purposes of massage. Accordingly, the Form 
-7-
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only slightly advanced Plaintiffs' position. 
B. Underlying Facts Regarding Whether Plaintiffs Were Performing 
Massages: 
15. The only material factual dispute in this matter is whether Plaintiffs' actions 
constituted "massage therapy" as defined by the Act. Based on the following 
facts, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs' actions did constitute the 




Plaintiff, Mr. Stucki, operates a relaxation spa called Beaches Bodyworks in Salt 
Lake County. Beaches offers relaxation techniques for their clients including 
Reiki, aroma therapy, and "light touching." 
Beaches' employees perform these services for a fee, which is split between the 
company and the employee performing said services. 
In August 2011, DOPL received an anonymous call that Beaches was performing 
massage therapy without a license. DOPL investigated the allegations and 
concluded that two Beaches employees - Leisa Metcalf and Middony Roman5 -
were performing massages without a license and issued them cease and desist 
orders. DOPL did not fine either Ms. Metcalf or Ms. Roman. 
19. Ms. Metcalf was cited with "practicing massage without a license" during the 
period of June 27, 2011 (when she was hired by Beaches) through September 1, 
2011, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-1-S0I(l)(a). See (Pls.' Ex. 3). 
-She discussed the citation afterwards with Ms. Pettley, who had investigated the 
5 Ms. Roman was a named Plaintiff but abandoned her claim before trial. Accordingly, her claim is 
dismissed. 
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matter. Ms. Pettley testified that after she explained the Act and DOPL's 
definition of massage, Ms. Metcalf acknowledged that she had performed 
massages. Ms. Metcalf denies that she made such an admission. The Court does 
not find that any such admission, if made, would be helpful to decide whether Ms. 
Metcalfs actions actually constituted massage under the statute. She is not a 
massage therapist and therefore, would have relied on DOPL's understanding of 
what constitutes a massage under the Act. The Court is charged with determining 
whether a massage occurred based on the facts. Ms. Metcalf s belief, at the time 
of her meeting with Ms. Pettley, has low, if any, probative value. 
20. Ms. Metcalf testified about the services she performed. She admitted performing 
"light touch" techniques to her clients' arms, legs, and back. She also admitted to 
applying oils to her clients' arms, legs, and back. She further testified that she 
was led to believe that "light touch" did not constitute massage, because she was 
only contacting the skin, and for there to be a massage, there needed to be more 
pressure so as to constitute a "deep muscle massage." 
21. Mr. Stucki likewise received a citation, for hiring unlicensed massage therapists in 
violation of Section 58-l-50l(l)(c). (Pls.' Ex. 2). In addition to a cease and 
desist order, he was fined $800. 
22. Mr. Stucki also met with DOPL officials to discuss the Act after he received the 
citation. Mr. Stucki seemed earnest in his desire to comply with the relevant 
governing statute. He claimed that he understood that "light touching of the skin" 
did not constitute a massage under the Act and that he trained his employees to 
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perform only light touch massages, as opposed to what he called "deep muscle 
massages." 
Mr. Stucki admitted that prior to the citation, his workers applied oils to their 
clients. But, once he was told by DOPL that oil rubs constitute massage, he 
stopped the practice. Mr. Stucki candidly admitted that he did not realize that the 
use of oils would constitute a massage and said that that had "slipped by him." 
The Court found that to be persuasive evidence that Mr. Stucki violated the Act 
by encouraging his employees to perform oil rubs. Moreover, the fact that he told 
his employees to stop using oil after he learned that oil rubs constitute massage, 
does not retroactively excuse Beaches' prior Mongful conduct. 
Notably, the screen shot of Beaches' website disclaimed massages, stating 
"Beaches is not an offer for message [sic] as defined by Utah law." See (State's 
Ex. 1 ). It also appears to advertise massages as "coming soon." However, there is 
a photo on the page that appears to show a female massager straddling the upper 
back of a male. Id. The site also advertises the use of "non-scented oils." Id. 
Lieutenant Cupello saw oils in each of Beaches' private rooms. 
DOPL attempted to impugn Mr. Stucki because after he was issued the citation, 
he stated- apparently mistakenly- that he had five (5) massage therapists on his 
staff. After Defendants sought the names of the licensed massage therapists, Mr. 
Stucki acknowledged he did not have any on his staff. Mr. Stucki claims this was 
an honest mistake; that he had assumed he had licensed massage therapists on 
staff, but when he delved deeper, he discovered he did not. Defendants argue that 
-10-
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Mr. Stucki's actions support that he had made up the existence of massage 
therapists in an attempt to thwart the citation. The email chain between the parties 
makes clear that he made such a representation and that it was false. On this 
issue, the Court finds that Mr. Stucki's actions -whether intentional or not -
provides the inference that he believed he needed to have licensed massage 
therapists on premises, perhaps because he knew or suspected that his employees 
were performing "massages." 
27. There was actually very little dispute about what really happened in this case. Ms. 
Metcalf provided "light touch" services for her clients, where she would lightly 
touch their skin or clothes. She conducting the "light touch" services all over her 
clients' bodies - on their arms, legs, and back. And, at time, she applied oils 
while she did so. The legal issue for this Court is whether those virtually 
undisputed facts constitute massage therapy under the Act. 
C. Ms. Metcalf's Actions Constitute "Massage Therapy" Under Section 
58-47b-102(6)(b): 
28. Under Section 5 8-4 7b- l 02, various actions can constitute massage therapy. The 
Court finds and concludes that Ms. Metcalf s actions constitute massage therapy 
under both sub-sections (6)(b) and 6(t). 
2 9. Subsection ( 6)(b) defines in part the "practice of massage therapy" and sets forth 
four independent requirements that have to be met. It states in relevant part that 
the "practice of massage therapy means ... the [i] systematic [ii] manual or 
mechanical manipulation [iii] of the soft tissue of the body [iv] for the purpose of 
-11-
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[various enwnerated purposes.]" Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-102. 
Systematic: The touching at issue was systematic as opposed to random or 
incidental. That is, Ms. Metcalf s self-proclaimed technique involved light 
touching all over the client's arms, legs and back, sometimes with oils. There is 
no serious argument that her conduct was not systematic. 6 
Manipulation: Much of the trial addressed whether "light touch" can constitute 
massage. Shannon Muir testified that light touching over the skin was a 
recognized modality of massage, known as "effleurage" or "feather touching." 
Mr. Lowe, see supra 6-7, acknowledged that light touching "could" constitute 
massage. 
Plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to draw a distinction between "light touch" 
and a touch involving deeper pressure. Under such a standard - where a certain 
pressure threshold would have to be shown - it would be difficult to define the 
parameters of massage and difficult to enforce. 
33. On the other hand, Defendants' position is that any touch and movement on the 
skin constitutes a massage, and that "light touch" falls within the parameters of a 
massage.7 See Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("In 
interpreting [statutory provisions], [a] court is guided by the principle that a 
6 
"Systematic" is defined in part as being carried on using step-by-step procedures. See Am. Heritage 
Dictionary, 1823 (3d ed. 1996). It is also defined as "presented or formulated as a coherent body of ideas or 
principles"; "methodical in procedure or plan"; "marked by thoroughness and regularity." 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/systematic. Under any definition, Ms. Metcalfs actions were 
systematic. 
7 The Rule that was passed after the citations in this matter were issued define manipulation in that broad 
manner. See Utah Admin. Code Rl56-47b., infra. 
-12-
01281 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statute is generally construed according to its plain language. (A court] 
presume[s] that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each 
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. [A court] must be guided by 
the law as it is .... When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to 
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction. Only when [ a court] 
find[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language need [it] seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy considerations." ( citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
34. Under the Act, DOPL is given deference to reasonably interpret the statute. Wells 
Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 626 P.2d 450,451 
(Utah 1981) ("Of course it is always the ultimate responsibility of this Court to 
35. 
interpret the terms of a statute to effectuate legislative intent. Nevertheless, some 
deference is due interpretation of a statute placed on it by the administrative 
agency which has the responsibility for administering that statute.") 
The Act does not provide a definition for the term "massage." Compare Utah 
Code Ann. §58-47b-102(6) (describing the "practice of massage therapy").8 
3 6. The Court concludes that the term "manipulation" includes not only a "deep 
pressure massage" but would also include a medium pressure massage, as well as, 
a "light touch" massage to the recipient. Such a conclusion: i) is supported by 
8 The dictionary definitions of massage varies and are not very helpful. One dictionary defines it as "[t]he 
rubbing or kneading of parts of the body to aid circulation or relax the muscles." See Am. Heritage Dictionary, l l06 
(3d ed. 1996). Another defines it more broadly: "manipulation of tissues (as by rubbing, kneading, or tapping) with 
the hand or an instrument for therapeutic purposes." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/massage. 
Notably, however, the Utah statute expressly applies to therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes. 
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general standards in the massage field, which recognizes "light touch" as an 
established massage technique - i.e., effleurage; ii) fits within the 
definitions/descriptions provided within the Act; and iii) is supported by DOPL's 
interpretation of the Act. 
The Court further notes that the purpose of the statute - regulating massages for 
health and safety reasons- is certainly supported by the type of conduct described 
here, where contact is made - albeit lightly - all over one's body. 
To the Soft Tissue of the Body. The statute defines "soft tissue" as "muscles and 
related connective tissue." Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-102(7). Both massage 
therapy experts - Ms. Muir and Mr. Lowe - testified that the skin is a soft tissue. 
The Court found that to be extremely persuasive that in the field of massage, skin 
is deemed to be a "soft tissue." 
Accordingly, even though the contact here was only light contact to the skin - and 
did not amount to deeper contact with muscles - the contact was nonetheless 
covered by the Act. Indeed, the reference to "soft tissue" suggests that light touch 
to the skin, was contemplated to constitute massage therapy under the Act. 
For a Prescribed Purpose. Sub-section (6) lists a variety of recognized purposes 
of massage therapy. The version of the Act in effect at the time, i.e., 2011, of the 
citation listed seven (7) distinct purposes, the last of which was for "recreational 
or other purposes." 
Notably, the 2011 version of the Act contained the word "and" between the 
enumerated purposes, while the 2012 amendment changed the word "and" to 
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42. 
''or." Plaintiffs argue that the use of the word "and" was in the conjunctive form 
and therefore, to constitute massage it must be shown that Plaintiffs met all 
enumerated purposes. 
While the Court agrees that generally the use of the term "and" connotes the 
conjunctive form, such a result here belies the remainder of the Act and would 
result in an absurd interpretation. See Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 
2011 UT 50,126, 267 P.3d 863 ("Generally, when interpreting statutes we seek 
to avoid interpretations which render some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd. Thus, when statutory language ... presents the court with two alternative 
readings, we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results. In defining the 
parameters of what constitutes an absurd result, we have noted that such a result 
must be so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could 
not have intended it." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
43. It is clear from a reading of the Act that the intended use of "and" - in this 
context -was to be in the disjunctive. 
44. The Act sets forth various "purposes" of massage. Utah Code Ann. 
§58-47b-102(6)(b). It includes, for example, the purpose of"promoting the health 
and well-being of a client," to "relieve pain", or for a "recreational or other 
purpose." Id. The purposes are inconsistent with one another thereby making 
compliance with all purposes - which would be required if "and" was used in the 
conjunctive - impossible. A massage given for purely therapeutic or health 
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reasons need not also be given for recreational reasons to fall under the Act. 
Compare id. at Sec. 58-47b-102(6)(d)-(h). 
Moreover, the last enumerated purpose includes the phrase "other purposes." Id. 
at Sec. 58-47b-102(6)(b)(vii). That language clearly reflects an intent to require 
any purpose; not all purposes mentioned in the Act need be shown. 
In fact, Plaintiffs' position would require not only the six ( 6) enumerated purposes 
be met, but every other purpose which would conceivably meet the definition of 
the "practice of massage therapy." Id. at Sec. 58-47b-102(6). Obviously, the 
statutory language intended to convey that any purpose, not all purposes, needed 
to be shown to constitute massage therapy. See Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 UT 50 
at 126. 
In this matter, the purpose of the services rendered by Plaintiffs, as stated by Mr. 
Stucki and Ms. Metcalf, was for relaxation and/or recreation. As described above, 
either relaxation or recreation is a recognized "purpose" under the Act.9 
Based upon the foregoing, all of the requirements under Part 102(6)(b) have been 
met. The Court finds and concludes that the conduct undertaken by Ms. Metcalf 
constituted massage therapy as defined in Section 58-47b-102(6)(b). 
C. Ms. Metcalf's Actions Constitute "Massage Therapy" Under Section 
58-47b-102(6)(f): 
Under sub-section (6)(±), "oil rubs" constitute massage therapy. Notably, that 
9 Note that the Plaintiff argues that an "other purpose" must include "other acts of the same general kind, 
class, character or nature as those enumerated beforehand," relying on State v A. T., 2001 UT 82, ~ 13. However, it 
appears to the Court that relaxation is of a similar nature to pain relief, and "relaxing muscles." Plaintiff failed to 
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section is not predicated on "manipulation;" it simply requires "oil rubs." 
50. Rub is not a defined term, and its dictionary definition is a broad one - "the 
application of friction with pressure." See http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/rubs. 
51. The Court concludes that applying oil to the skin by "gliding" it along the skin, as 
Ms. Metcalf has testified, constitutes an oil rub. 
52. It is undisputed that during the relevant period, the employees/service providers of 
Beaches engaged in the practice of applying oil over their clients' bodies. The 
Court finds and concludes that pursuant to the relevant section, this conduct 
constituted "oil rubs" and thus constituted the "practice of massage therapy." 
53. The Court concludes that Mr. Stucki directed his employees to cease and desist 
from applying oils after the citation was issued. However, this action by Mr. 
Stucki does not excuse or otherwise negate, the prior conduct of his employees in 
engaging in the practice of massage therapy- without a license. 
D. Miscellaneous Factors and Arguments: 
54. In addition to the requirements of sub-section 102( 6), to constitute massage 
therapy requiring a license, there needs to be a fee or other consideration for the 
services rendered. See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-47b-301. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiffs charged and received payments for their services. 
55. The Court further finds that the conduct herein was not performed by health care 
providers, therapists, athletic trainers, etc., and that the services rendered were not 
done gratuitously. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' services/conduct do not fall within any 
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56. 
of the exemptions provided in either Section 58-47b-304 or 58-1-307; nor, do 
Plaintiffs argue that any of those exemptions apply. 
Plaintiffs argued that DOPL's interpretation of the Act was overly broad and 
sought to improperly criminalize contact that could amount to slight brushing of 
the arm. That argument, however, was belied by the facts before the Court. The 
contact at issue here was neither incidental nor minimal. Ms. Metcalf touched her 
clients' arms, legs, and back, and, applied oil to those same parts of the body. 
This case did not involve a slight brushing of the arm, and so the Court need not 
speculate about whether those facts would constitute massage therapy. State v. 
Green, 2004 UT 76,145, 99 P.3d 820 (stating that a court will not evaluate 
claims "according to hypothetical situations not before the court."),· BV Lending, 
LLC v. Jordanelle Special Serv. Dist., 2015 UT App 117,120, 350 P.3d 636 ("A 
court can only grant relief for those issues properly before it.") 
57. Plaintiffs rely on Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah 2012), in 
support of their argument(s). In that matter, the court held that "Utah's 
cosmetology/barbering licensing scheme is so disconnected from the practice of 
African hairbraiding much less from whatever minimal threats to public health 
and safety are connected to braiding, that to premise [plaintiffs] right to earn a 
living by braiding hair on that scheme is wholly irrational and a violation of her 
constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 1215-16. Here, however, DOPL is not 
trying to regulate a field other than massage therapy. It is regulating massage 
therapy, regardless of who performs it. 
-18-
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58. Plaintiff also relied on a 2010 state district court case, Orem City v. Wood, case 
number 101200072, heard before the Honorable Thomas Low in the Fourth 
District. There, the court dismissed similar charges that were brought against an 
escort service. Judge Low ruled in favor of the escort service on the basis that 
Orem City could not show the statutory purpose required by Section 5 8-4 ?b-
59. 
l 02( 6)(b ). However, that matter was decided under the 2010 version of the 
version of the statute which only recognized "therapeutic" purposes for massages. 
That is, the 2010 version of part 102 did not include the catch-all "recreational or 
other purposes" language contained in the 2011 version, which applies here. 
Since then, the legislature has made clear that recreational purposes are covered 
by the Act. See 2011 version of the Act. 
Again, it is not this Court's role to second guess the legislature. See e.g. Cook v. 
Bell, 2014 UT 46, ,r 41, 344 P .3d 634 ("[T]he courts are in no position to second-
guess the legislature's judgments as to the weight of competing considerations, or 
the reasonableness of the legislature's judgments."); Corwell v. Corwell, 2008 UT 
App 49, ,r 12, 179 P.3d 821 ("When the legislature has spoken clearly on an issue, 
we are not free to second-guess its wisdom on grounds of policy." (citation 
omitted)). 
60. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Act is unduly harsh because a violation of the Act 
may lead to a criminal charge of a Class A Misdemeanor - though no such 
charges were brought in this case - while lewd sexual conduct might only be 
charged as a Class B Misdemeanor. 
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First of all, the Plaintiffs here were not criminally charged with a crime for 
etase 
performing massage. They were issued ~ and desist orders and fined for a 
licensure violation. 
Second, Plaintiffs' argument misconstrues the bases of the Act. The Act does not 
treat the act of massage more harshly than illegal lewd sexual acts. That is, there 
is no penalty for performing massage on another person. There is, however a 
penalty for practicing massage therapy for a fee without a license. 10 
Plaintiffs' disagreement with the statutory scheme licensing massage therapy 
should be addressed with the legislature. The basis of the Act is to regulate the 
massage therapy industry. The purpose is to protect people, see (Lowe Report, 
Pis.' Ex. 5), and also to protect the integrity of the massage industry.See (Muir 
Report, States' Ex. 4). The citation(s) issued by DOPL are consistent with the 
language and purpose of the Act. 
E. Arguments Concerning Rule R156-47b: 
64. In 2012, after the events of this case, the Board passed a rule that defined 
"manipulation" as "contact with movement, involving touching the clothed or 
unclothed body." Utah Admin. Code, R156-47b. This Rule was not in place 
when the citations were given and therefore it would be inappropriate for the 
10 Moreover, it is not this Court's role to challenge the wisdom of penalizing people more for a licensure 
violation as compared to certain lewd acts. That, too, is an issue for the legislature. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 
430 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[R]eviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority given 
legislatures to determine the types of punishments for crimes[.]"(citation omitted)). 
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65. 
Court to rely on the Rule in this case. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs ask the Court to 
rule on the Rule's validity and have filed a separate claim for declaratory relief as 
to the Rule. 
The Court has stated its concern that addressing the Rule would constitute an 
advisory opinion because it crune about after the citations were issued. Plaintiffs 
nonetheless urge the Court to address the issue because Plaintiffs, and those 
similarly situated, are harmed by the Act and, because it is likely that this issue 
will recur for Plaintiffs. 
66. Given Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the Rule, the Court concludes that it has 
jurisdiction to address the issue as a separate and independent claim apart from 
the Court's de novo review of the DOPL Citations. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12, ~ 15, 66 P.3d 592 ("While the power of Utah's judiciary is not constitutionally 
restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies,' we still require four threshold elements to 
be satisfied before we may proceed with a declaratory judgment action: ( 1) a 
justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose interests are adverse, (3) a legally 
protectible interest residing with the party seeking relief, and ( 4) issues ripe for 
judicial determination. Stated another way, [a] justiciable controversy authorizing 
entry of a declaratory judgment is one wherein the plaintiff is possessed of a 
protectible interest at law or in equity and the right to a judgment, and the 
judgment, when pronounced, must be such as would give specific relief." 
( citations and quotations omitted)). 
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67. Given that Plaintiffs actions have been deemed to constitute massage therapy, (@ 
and the likelihood - at least according to Plaintiffs counsel - that this issue will 
recur, the Court will address Plaintiffs claim. 
~ 68. The Board has the statutory authority to promulgate rules that effectuate the 
regulation of massage therapy. See Utah Code Ann. §§58-47B-201, 58-1-201 et. 
seq. 
~ 
69. According to Ms. Muir, who was on the governing Board and had first hand 
knowledge of the Rule's passage, the Board promulgated Rule Rl 56 ("Rule"), 
(j Utah Admin. Code Rl56-47b, to define the term "manipulate" in the broadest 
sense possible - i.e., to reflect that contact plus any movement whatsoever, 
constitutes manipulation. The reason for such a broad construction was twofold. 
(@ First, to make certain that Reiki - which involves contact but no manipulation of 
the skin i.e., channeling energy for alleged healing/curative purposes by contact 
with the skin - is not subject to the Massage Therapy Act. Second, to broadly 
(JD 
define massage therapy to reflect the generally accepted notions of massage 
therapy; for example, deeming "light touch" as a modality of massage. 
~ 70. Plaintiffs argue that such a broad definition of the term "manipulation" would 
effectively swallow the entire Act. Plaintiffs follow that in doing so, DOPL has, 
by Rule, expanded its regulatory authority to cover SOB's. While the Court 
@ 
agrees that DOPL may not, by rule, expand its regulatory scope beyond the 
governing statute, the Court concludes that the Rule did not have that affect. 
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the Act to encompass certain acts of intimate sexual conduct that are not "massage 
therapy." That, however, is not what the Rule does. 
72. In fact, the Honorable L.A. Dever previously ruled that such action by DOPL 
would be inappropriate. In his December 2, 2013 Order, as amended by his Order 
of September 17, 2014, Judge Dever held, "The Division may not define the scope 
of activities, including manipulation, of individuals that are not licensed massage 
therapists or holding themselves out, by word or act, as massage therapists." The 
Court interprets that to mean that a rule may not empower DOPL to regulate 
people or conduct that the legislature has not permitted. 
73. Here, however, the Rule is simply clarifying the statute; it is not expanding its 
reach to persons who would not ordinarily be covered by the Act. The Rule 
makes clear that any movement with contact - including light touch massage, 
which is a recognized modality of massage called "effleurage" - constitutes 
manipulation. See Utah Admin. Code R156-47b (10) 11 • The Rule did not cause 
DOPL to widen their regulatory web outside of the realm of massage therapy. 
74. Mr. Lowe testified that the purpose of massage legislation is to "protect public 
safety." In his Report, (see Pls.' Ex. 5), he states that the reasons for regulating the 
field is to protect clients from physical and psychological harm. Id. He posits that 
because the term "massage" has been associated with sexually-oriented 
businesses, and because authorities may wish to strongly regulate SOBs, they may 
11 Provides," 'Manipulation', as used in Subsection 58-47b-/02(6)(b), means contact with movement, 
involving touching the clothed or unclothed body." (emphasis added). 
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be tempted to broaden the reach of their regulations to catch SOB operators in 
their net. Plaintiffs' counsel made this argument a centerpiece of their 
presentation. However, that position is completely unsupported by the evidence 
in this case. 
Ms. Muir testified that the reason the Rule was passed was to make sure that 
Reiki - an energy transfer activity that does not involve any manipulation of the 
skin - was not included in the definition. 
Ms. Muir also testified that regulations (i.e., licensure requirements) are necessary 
to protect the integrity of the massage industry. Inferentially, she meant that the 
massage industry did not want to be affiliated with the SOB industry. In other 
words, the massage industry would like to distinguish itself from the SOB 
industry; not to acquire the power to regulate SOBs. 
Also, Ms. Pettley testified credibly that she had never cited an SOB, and had no 
interest in doing so. DOPL has no authority to regulate SOBs; other authorities 
such as local cities or police departments have that role. It defies logic that DOPL 
would seek to increase its case load by trying to regulate another field, for 
example the SOB field, particularly when that field is already within the authority 
of law enforcement. 
There was no evidence to support Plaintiffs' claim that DOPL was seeking to 
expand its authority into the area of SOB' s. 
In fact, here, the police separately investigated Beaches for SOB violations. At 
the same time, Ms. Pettley was interested in assessing whether there was a 
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violation of the Act and to make certain that the Plaintiffs were educated on that 
issue. 
80. There was no evidence that Ms. Pettley went beyond DOPL's reach in this matter, 
or had any interest in doing so. And, the fact that she spent time with Ms. Metcalf 
and Mr. Stucki to make sure they understood the Act belies Plaintiffs' arguments 
that Ms. Pettley's actions were borne out of a desire to expand the reach of her 
authority to regulate SOB's. 
81. More importantly, "manipulation" defined in the manner described above, does not 
create a de facto regulation of SOBs on its face, as Plaintiffs suggest. See Utah 
Admin. Code Rl 56-4 7b (10). Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument - that such a broad 
definition of a massage will "swallow the rule" - belies the statutory scheme, 
which makes clear that manipulation alone does not constitute massage. 
82. In order to constitute massage therapy requiring a license, the following must also 
be shown: a) there must be payment for the services; b) the manipulation must be 
systematic; c) the manipulation must be to soft tissue; and d) the manipulation 
must be for one of the enumerated purposes stated in the statute. See e.g. Sec. 
58-47b-102. 
83. By promulgating a rule that broadly defined "manipulation," DOPL was not 
acting inconsistent with prior practice and did not cause people who were not 
already subject to the Act, to suddenly become subject to the Act's reach. The 
Rule was not an impermissible use ofDOPL's authority and had a reasonable and 
rational basis - to aid DOPL in regulating massage therapy and to help enforce its 
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licensure provisions. The Court does not declare that Rule to be invalid based on 
any of the legal arguments presented by Plaintiffs. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. 
2. 
The Court concludes that Ms. Metcalf engaged in conduct that constitutes the 
"practice of massage therapy" under Utah Code Annotated Section 5 8-4 7b- l 02, 
and that she received a fee for her services, and did so without a license. 
Accordingly, she was in violation of the Massage Therapy Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 
58-l-501(a), and so, DOPL was properly authorized to issue a cease and desist 
order to her pursuant to Section 58-1-502(2)(b)(ii). Accordingly, the cease and 
desist order was valid and Ms. Metcalfs claims challenging DOPL's issuance of 
the cease and desist order are hereby dismissed. 
Based on Ms. Metcalf s conduct, and the similar conduct by other Beaches 
employees of which Mr. Stucki was aware - especially concerning the use of oils 
- Mr. Stucki employed persons who were performing massage therapy without a 
license in violation of the Massage Therapy Act. Accordingly, his actions were 
in violation of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-S0l(c). Therefore, DOPL was 
properly authorized to issue a cease and desist order to him pursuant to Section 
58-l-502(2)(b)(ii), and to issue a fine of not greater than $1,000 pursuant to 
Section 58-l-502(2)G)(i). Thus, the cease and desist order and the $800 fine 
upheld were valid and Mr. Stucki's claims challenging DOPL's issuance of the 
cease and desist order and imposition of the fine, are hereby dismissed. 
3. PlaintiffMiddonay Roman abandoned her claims prior to trial; accordingly, those 
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claims are hereby dismissed. 
4. The Rule promulgated by DOPL defining "manipulation" as any "touch plus 
contact" is a valid exercise of DOPL's rulemaking authority and is upheld. 
5. All of Plaintiffs claims are to be dismissed with prejudice. All parties are to pay 
their costs and fees incurred in this matter. 
6. Defendants are to prepare a final order and to comply with the requirements of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(j)(2). 
1A 
So ORDERED this /3 day of November, 2015. 
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2011 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: Michael T. Morley 
Senate Sponsor: J. Stuart Adams 
7 LONGTITLE 
8 General Description: 
9 This bill amends provisions of Title 58, Occupations and Professions, regarding the 
IO administration and enforcement of licensing laws and related provisions. 
l I Highlighted Provisions: 
J 2 This bill: 
13 • provides that members of licensing boards can continue to serve for a limited time 
















• provides for notification by an applicant or licensee to the Di vision of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing regarding name and address changes; 
• provides the division with fine and citation authority for the unlicensed practice of a 
profession or the hiring of unlicensed individuals; 
• clarifies licensure by endorsement provisions for professional engineers, 
professional structural engineers, and professional land surveyors; 
• modifies the qualifications for licensure as an advanced practice registered nurse; 
• modifies the definition of practice of massage therapy for purposes of the Massage 
Practice Therapy Act; 
• modifies continuing education requirement provisions for licensed elevator 
mechanics and elevator contract licensees; 
• makes technical changes to vocational rehabilitation counselor licensing provisions; 
• modifies the term of license provisions; and 
• makes certain technical changes. EXHIBIT A 
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646 (B) if the person is not licensed under this chapter. the division may not issue a license 
647 to the person under this chapter. 
648 (b) If a person has been charged with a felony other than a violent felony, as defined in 
649 Subsection 76-3-203.5( l )(c), and, as a result, the person has been convicted, entered a plea of 
650 guilty or nolo contendere, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere held in abeyance 
65 I pending the successful completion of probation: 
652 (i) if the person is licensed under this chapter, the division shall determine whether the 
653 felony disqualifies the person for licensure under this chapter and act upon the license, as 
654 required, in accordance with Section 58-1-40 l; and 
655 (ii) if the person is not licensed under this chapter, the person may not file an 
656 application for licensure under this chapter any sooner than five years after having completed 
657 the conditions of the sentence or plea agreement. 
658 Section 9. Section 58-47b-102 is amended to read: 
659 58-47b-102. Definitions. 
660 In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102. as used in this chapter: 
661 (1) "Board" means the Board of Massage Therapy created in Section 58-47b-20I. 
662 (2) "Breast" means the female mammary gland and does not include the muscles. 
663 connective tissue, or other soft tissue of the upper chest. 
664 (3) "Homeostasis" means maintaining, stabilizing, or returning to equilibrium the 
665 muscular system. 
666 (4) "Massage apprentice" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage 
667 apprentice to work under the direct supervision of a licensed massage therapist. 
668 (5) 11Massage therapist" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage 
669 therapist. 
670 (6) "Practice of massage therapy" means: 
671 (a) the examination, assessment. and evaluation of the soft tissue structures of the body 
672 for the purpose of devising a treatment plan to promote homeostasis; 
673 (b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue of the body for 
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674 the [theiapcutic] purpose of: 
675 (i) promoting the health and well-being of a client; 
676 (ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
677 (iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
678 (iv) relieving pain; 
679 (v) restoring metabolic balance; [and] 
680 (vi) achieving homeostasis; and 
681 {vii} recreational or other purposes: 
682 (c) the use of the hands or a mechanical or electrical apparatus in connection with this 
683 Subsection (6); 
684 (d) the use of rehabilitative procedures involving the soft tissue of the body; 
685 (e) range of motion or movements without spinal adjustment as set forth in Section 
686 58-73-102; 
687 (f) oil rubs, heat lamps, salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, shower, steam, and 
688 cabinet baths; 
689 (g) manual traction and stretching exercise; 
690 (h) correction of muscular distortion by treatment of the soft tissues of the body; 
691 (i) counseling, education, and other advisory services to reduce the incidence and 
692 severity of physical disability, movement dysfunction, and pain; 









(k) the practice described in this Subsection (6) on an animal to the extent pennitted 
(i) Subsection 58-28-307( 12); 
(ii) the provisions of this chapter; and 
(iii) division rule. 
(7) "Soft tissue" means the muscles and related connective tissue. 
(8) "Unlawful conduct 11 is as defined in Sections 58-1-50 I and 58-47b-501. 
(9) "Unprofessional conduct11 is as defined in Sections 58- I -50 I and 58-47b-502 and as 
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702 may be further defined by division rule. 
703 Section l 0. Section 58-55-302. 7 is amended to read: 
704 58-55-302.7. Continuing education requirements for electricians, elevator 
705 mechanics, and plumbers. 
706 ( 1) As used in this section: 
707 (a) "Licensed electrician" means an individual licensed under this chapter as an 
708 apprentice electrician, journeyman electrician, master electrician, residential journeyman 
709 electrician, or residential master electrician. 
71 O (b) "Licensed elevator mechanic" means an individual licensed under this chapter as an 
711 elevator mechanic. 
712 [tb,] .(£1 "Licensed plumber" means an individual licensed under this chapter a'i an 
713 apprentice plumber, journeyman plumber, master plumber, residential journeyman plumber, or 
714 residential master plumber. 
715 (2) Beginning December 1, 2010, during each two-year renewal cycle established by 
716 rule under Subsection 58-55-303( J ): 
717 (a) a licensed electrician shall complete 16 hours of continuing education under the 
7 J 8 continuing education program established under this section; [and] 
719 (b) a licensed plumber shall complete 12 hours of continuing education under the 
720 continuing education program established under this section[:]: and 
721 (c} a licensed elevator mechanic shall complete eight hours of continuing education 
722 under the continuing education program established under this section. 
723 (3) The commission shall, with the concurrence of the division, establish by rule: 
724 (a) a continuing education program for licensed electricians; [and] 
725 
726 
(b) a continuing education program for licensed elevator mechanics; and 
(th,].{£} a continuing education program for licensed plumbers. 
727 (4) The division may contract with a person to establish and maintain a continuing 
728 education registry to include: 
729 (a) an online application for a continuing education course provider to apply to the 
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@ MASSAGE THERAPY ACT AMENDMENTS 
2 2012 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 




~ 8 General Description: 
Senate Sponsor: Aaron Osmond 
9 This bill modifies a definition in the Massage Therapy Practice Act. 
IO Highlighted Provisions: 
1 1 This bill: 
12 • modifies the definition of "practice of massage therapy" to include providing, 
l 3 offering. or advertising a paid service using the term massage, regardless of whether 
14 the service includes physical contact~ and 
15 • makes technical changes. 
16 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
17 None 
18 Other Special Clauses: 
19 None 
20 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
21 AMENDS: 
22 58-47b-102, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2011, Chapter 367 
C@ 23 
24 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
25 Section I. Section 58-47b-102 is amended to read: 
26 58-47b-102. Definitions. 
27 In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102. as used in this chapter: 
28 ( 1) "Board" means the Board of Massage Therapy created in Section 58-47b-201. 
29 (2) "Breast" means the female mammary gland and does not include theEiHIBIT Q 
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30 connective tissue. or other soft tissue of the upper chest. 
31 (3) "Homeostasis" means maintaining, stabilizing, or returning to equilibrium the 
32 muscular system. 
33 (4) "Massage apprentice" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage 
34 apprentice to work under the direct supervision of a licensed massage therapist. 
35 (5) "Massage therapist" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage 
36 therapist. 
37 (6) "Practice of massage therapy" means: 
38 (a) the examination, assessment, and evaluation of the soft tissue structures of the body 
39 for the purpose of devising a treatment plan to promote homeostasis; 
40 (b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue of the body for 
41 the purpose of: 
42 
43 
(i) promoting the therapeutic health and weIJ-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 




(iv) relieving pain; 
(v) restoring metabolic balance; 
( vi) achieving homeostasis; [and) Qt 
48 (vii) [1ec1eational 01] other purposes; 
49 (c) the use of the hands or a mechanical or electrical apparatus in connection with this 
50 Subsection (6); 
51 (d) the use of rehabilitative procedures involving the soft tissue of the body; 
52 (e) range of motion or movements without spinal adjustment as set forth in Section 
53 58-73- I 02; 
54 (0 oil rubs. heat lamps. salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, shower, steam, and 
55 cabinet baths; 
56 (g) manual traction and stretching exercise; 
57 (h) correction of muscular distortion by treatment of the soft tissues of the body; 
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58 (i) counseling, education, and other advisory services to reduce the incidence and 
59 severity of physical disability, movement dysfunction. and pain; 
60 U) similar or related activities and modality techniques; [and] 
61 (k) the practice described in this Subsection (6) on an animal to the extent pem1illed 
62 by: 




(ii) the provisions of this chapter; and 
(iii) di vision rule[:]: or 
m providing, offering, or advertising a paid service using the term massage or a 
67 derivative of the word massage, regardless of whether the service includes physical contact. 
68 (7) "Soft tissue" means the muscles and related connective tissue. 
69 (8) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 58-47b-501. 
70 (9) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 58A7b-502 and as 
71 may be further defined by division rule. 
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Utah Code 
58-47b-102 Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Massage Therapy created in Section 58-47b-201. 
(2) "Breast'' means the female mammary gland and does not include the muscles, connective 
tissue, or other soft tissue of the upper chest. 
(3) "Homeostasis" means maintaining, stabilizing, or returning to equilibrium the muscular system. 
(4) "Massage apprentice" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage 
apprentice to work under the direct supervision of a licensed massage therapist. 
(5) "Massage therapist" means an individual licensed under this chapter as a massage therapist. 
(6) "Practice of massage therapy" means: 
(a) the examination, assessment, and evaluation of the soft tissue structures of the body for the 
purpose of devising a treatment plan to promote homeostasis; 
(b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue of the body for the 
purpose of: 
(i) promoting the therapeutic health and well-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
(iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
(iv) relieving pain; 
(v) restoring metabolic balance; 
(vi) achieving homeostasis; or 
(vii) other purposes; 
(c) the use of the hands or a mechanical or electrical apparatus in connection with this 
Subsection (6); 
(d) the use of rehabilitative procedures involving the soft tissue of the body; 
(e) range of motion or movements without spinal adjustment as set forth in Section 58-73-102; 
(f) oil rubs, heat lamps, salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, shower, steam, and cabinet baths; 
(g) manual traction and stretching exercise; 
(h) correction of muscular distortion by treatment of the soft tissues of the body; 
(i) counseling, education, and other advisory services to reduce the incidence and severity of 
physical disability, movement dysfunction, and pain; 
U) similar or related activities and modality techniques; 
(k) the practice described in this Subsection (6) on an animal to the extent permitted by: 
(i) Subsection 58-28-307 (12); 
(ii) the provisions of this chapter; and 
(iii) division rule; or 
(I) providing, offering, or advertising a paid service using the term massage or a derivative of the 
word massage, regardless of whether the service includes physical contact. 
(7) "Soft tissue" means the muscles and related connective tissue. 
(8) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 58-47b-501. 
(9) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 58-47b-502 and as may be 
further defined by division rule. 
Amended by Chapter 34, 2012 General Session 
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Utah Code 
58-47b-201 Board. 
(1) There is created the Board of Massage Therapy consisting of: 
(a) four massage therapists; and 
(b) one member of the general public. 
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Section 58-1-201. 
(3) The duties and responsibilities of the board are in accordance with Sections 58-1-202 and 
58-1-203. In addition, the board shall designate one of its members on a permanent or rotating 
basis to: 
(a) assist the division in reviewing complaints concerning the unlawful or unprofessional conduct 
of a licensee; and 
(b) advise the division in its investigation of these complaints. 
(4) A board member who has, under Subsection (3), reviewed a complaint or advised in its 
investigation may be disqualified from participating with the board when the board serves as a 
presiding officer in an adjudicative proceeding concerning the complaint. 
Amended by Chapter 159, 1998 General Session 
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Utah Code 
58-47b-501 Unlawful conduct. 
"Unlawful conduct'' includes: 
(1) practicing, engaging in, or attempting to practice or engage in massage therapy without holding 
a current license as a massage therapist or a massage apprentice under this chapter; 
(2) advertising or representing himself as practicing massage therapy when not licensed to do so; 
and 
(3) massaging, touching, or applying any instrument or device by a licensee in the course of 
practicing or engaging in massage therapy to: 
(a) genitals or anus; and 
(b) breasts of a female patron, except when a female patron requests breast massage, as may 
be further defined by division rule, and signs a written consent form, which must also include 
the signature of a parent or legal guardian if the patron is a minor, authorizing the procedure 
and outlining the reason for it before the procedure is performed. 
Amended by Chapter 309, 2000 General Session 
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Utah Code 
58-47b-503 Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) 1 any individual who commits an act of unlawful conduct 
under Section 58-47b-501 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) Sexual conduct that violates Section 58-47b-501 and Title 76, Utah Criminal Code 1 shall be 
subject to the applicable penalties in Title 76, Utah Criminal Code. 
Amended by Chapter 309, 2000 General Session 
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R156. Commerce, Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
Rl56-47b. Massage Therapy Practice Act Rule. 
Rl56-47b-102. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 47b, 
as used in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 47b, or this rule: 
(1) "Accrediting agency" means an organization, association or 
commission nationally recognized by the United States Department of 
Education as a reliable authority in assessing the quality of 
education or training provided by the school or institution. 
(2) "Clinic" means performing the techniques and skills 
learned as a student under the curriculum of a registered school or 
an accredited school on the public, while in a supervised student 
setting. 
(3} "Direct supervision" as used in Subsection 58-47b-
302 (3) (e) means that the apprentice supervisor, acting within the 
scope of the supervising licensee's license, is in the facility 
where massage is being performed and directs the work of an 
apprentice pursuant to this chapter under Subsection Rl56-1-
102a(4} (a) while the apprentice is engaged in performing massage. 
(4) "Distance learning" means the acquisition of knowledge and 
skills through information and instruction encompassing all 
technologies and other forms of learning at a distance, outside a 
school of massage meeting the standards in Section Rl56-47b-302 
including internet, audio/visual recordings, mail or other 
correspondence. 
{5} "FSMTB'' means the Federation of State Massage Therapy 
Boards. 
(6} "Hands on instruction" means direct experience with or 
application of the education or training in either a school of 
massage therapy or apprenticeship. 
(7) "Lymphatic massage" means a method using light pressure 
applied by the hands to the skin in specific maneuvers to promote 
drainage of the lymphatic fluid from the tissue. 
(8) "Manipulation", as used in Subsection 58-47b-102 (6) {b}, 
means contact with movement, involving touching the clothed or 
unclothed body. 
______ (_9 ___ )_"Massage client services" means practicing the techniques 
and skills learned as an apprentice on the public in training under 
direct supervision. 
([-9].!.Q) "NCBTMB" means the National Certification Board for 
Therapeutic Massage and Bodywork. 
( [¼].!.!.) "Recognized school" means a school located in a state 
other than Utah, whose students, upon graduation, are recognized as 
having completed the educational requirements for licensure in that 
jurisdiction. · 
( [HJl,~_) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in Title 58, 
Chapters 1 and 47b, is further defined, in accordance with 
Subsection 58-1-203 ( 1) ( e) in Section Rl 56-4 7b-502. 
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